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ABSTRACT 
 Considerable effort goes into forging tools a corporation can use to shape its shareholder 
base. Much effort is geared toward promoting long investor time horizons, presumed to be a 
valuable but rare appetite among many shareholders. Less attention has been focused on 
promoting greater commitment, though attracting shareholders willing to stake large percentages 
of their portfolio in a given company’s stock may prove way more valuable than having numerous 
large index funds on the shareholder list.   
 In three ways, this article adds to the toolkit on shareholder cultivation. First, this article 
stresses that a shareholder’s relative portfolio concentration in a particular company’s stock is as 
important as average holding periods. Such an orientation is unusual in corporate life. But today’s 
world is dominated by index fund investors whose portfolio diversification limits their ability to 
act as informed shareholders. A focus on relative portfolio concentration is therefore becoming 
critical.  
 Second, this discussion introduces, and is motivated by, new evidence showing a 
correlation between a high density of such shareholders and superior corporate performance. In 
fact, shareholders exhibiting both traits—patience and conviction—have long been cultivated by 
an elite group of companies whose long-term performance has benefited. The most famous is 
Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway and there are scores of other less famous but equally 
accomplished.  
 Third, focusing on such quality shareholders, as Buffett long ago dubbed them, this article 
offers numerous tools a corporation may use to achieve a shareholder base with a high density of 
quality shareholders. These include communications strategies, such as stressing long-term 
performance metrics in corporate disclosure, and substantive practices, such as prioritizing the 
art of capital allocation.  Managers and quality shareholders themselves are the target audience.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 So complex is today’s shareholder demographic that some say it is akin to the U.S. 
Electoral College—an arcane but powerful maze intelligent candidates must master.1  Just as 
Presidential campaigns first lock up their base and then seek the swing voter, corporate leaders 
must first secure a faithful shareholder cohort and then assure any further votes that might 
determine voting outcomes. The map varies by company, but consists of activists, indexers, 
transients, and long-term concentrated owners. As in politics, these groups may be as reliable as 
California or Texas, or as up-for-grabs as Ohio or Pennsylvania.  
 While the analogy is intriguing, there is one huge difference between political and 
corporate elections.  Unlike politicians, who are stuck with the citizens they face, directors can 
influence the mix of the make-up of their shareholder base, in terms of such important features as 
time horizon, commitment level, and engagement.  
 Many managers use their bully pulpit to deter shareholders unaligned with their corporate 
philosophy.  At a Starbuck’s shareholders meeting, Howard Schultz told a shareholder challenging 
the company’s hiring practices that he should sell the stock. Joe Steinberg so advised a Leucadia 
shareholder challenging the company’s hold-or-divest policies. In a letter to shareholders of The 
Washington Post Co., Don Graham stressed the company’s long-term outlook, adding: “If you are 
a shareholder and YOU care about our quarterly results, perhaps you should think about selling 
the stock.” 
 Besides hectoring, a variety of tools have been shown to be useful in sculpting a 
shareholder base. Analysis has focused heavily on practices designed to entice long-term 
shareholders. They span the range of corporate affairs, from by-laws to mission statements and 
governance philosophy to dividend policy. 
This Article contributes three transformative points. First it adds to time horizon the feature 
of concentration, establishing a focus on quality shareholders (hereinafter abbreviated as QS).2 
Second, it provides new evidence of the value of this perspective, from the perspective of both QS 
and the companies they invest in. Third, it explores how numerous corporate practices can be used 
to attract QS.  
Cultivation options include communications strategies such as mounting appealing annual 
meetings, issuing candid annual shareholder letters, dampening quarterly forecasting, and stressing 
long-term performance measures. Substantively, cultivation options include developed and 
publicized standards governing capital allocation, from acquisitions to dividends, as well as 
divestitures, and governance strategies such as board selection criteria and enhanced shareholder 
voting rights for coveted shareholder cohorts. 
 
 1 See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A Case 
Study, HARV. GOV. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019). 
 2 The abbreviation QS for quality shareholders conveys both an informal and formal meaning. The 
informal sense is of shareholders who are among the most patient and most concentrated among 
shareholders. The formal definition is based on a variety of statistical methods used to identify those 
possessing such features from the entire population of institutional shareholders obliged under federal 
securities laws to disclose such information. The research is explained in LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, 
QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW MANAGERS ATTRACT THE BEST SHAREHOLDERS (2020), App. A. 
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 These perspectives are necessitated by changing shareholder demographics. The rise of 
indexing, including its seemingly effortless strategy of investing along with enormous power in 
voting, has crowded out the share of corporate equity held by QS. The latter is down to as little as 
$4 trillion in assets, in all, compared to a total market capitalization exceeding $30 trillion.  This 
Article responds to the fact that the quality population has been shrinking. It stresses the untapped 
potential of QS and offers methods to attract and cultivate them.  
I. STAKES 
 This Part opens with a review of the literature on corporate cultivation to shareholder tastes. 
It turns to the current landscape, indicating that the literature warrants updating in light of the rise 
of indexers and the appeal of quality.   
A. Past Practice 
 The shareholder cultivation literature coalesces around a discrete group of practices and 
variations on their themes, with greatest attention focused on long-term versus short-term 
shareholders. Encompassing the recognized elements of corporate administration, this body of 
research can provide a useful framework for organizing analysis. Yet a review of this literature 
entices attention to the gaps it leaves, in both the available practices and the relevant shareholder 
types.  
 The literature’s most general treatments cover many of the topics appearing on most syllabi 
for a basic course in corporations, such as place of incorporation and transfer restrictions3 as well 
as stock exchange listings and the content of bylaws.4 For example, a Delaware incorporation and 
New York Stock Exchange listing signal credibility that’s important to certain investors and will 
attract them. While importantly treating hotly contested topics of corporate governance, such as 
board structures and director independence,5 the result is a selective and provisional body of work. 
 Among specific topics receiving significant attention in this literature are corporate 
communications,6 including particular focus on the statement of corporate mission7 as well as 
deterring short-term shareholders by avoiding emphasis on quarterly earnings and forecasts.8  On 
 
 3 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849 
(2012). 
 4 See Tamara Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 
(2014).   
 5 See Alicia J. Davis, The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate Governance,” COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1 (2015) (the title’s quoted clause references its critique of influential piece it critiques).   
 6 See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from 
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011). 
 7 See Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Governance: Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of 
Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 394 (1987). 
 8 See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political 
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 131 (2014) (noting that law’s 
requirements are limited to disclosure under the reasonable investor standard); Nadelle Grossman, Turning 
a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
905, 915-918 (2010) (short-term information bias inherent in the type of information required to be 
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the other hand, less detailed attention has examined two tools of particular use in attracting QS: 
the annual meeting9 and annual letter to shareholders.10 Perhaps or central importance to attracting 
QS, the literature has treated aspects of capital allocation prominently, especially dividends and 
buybacks,11 though not acquisitions or divestitures.12 
 The literature has devoted considerable analysis of alternative capital structures, some as 
part of the broader debate on dual class capital structures.13  In a related vein, increasing thought 
is given to tailoring shareholder voting rules to cater to desired cohorts, especially time-weighted 
voting14 or granting enhanced voting rights to a separate class of long-term shares.15 I have recently 
contributed the specific perspective of QS by putting forth a proposal for enhanced voting power 
for QS, based on both long holding periods and high portfolio concentration.16  
 Much of this literature consciously focuses on investment time horizons,17 exploring the 
practices that attract or repel long-term rather than short-term shareholders,18  Some work draws 
 
disclosed); Lynne L. Dallas, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 
560 (2016); Rock, supra note 3, at 870; Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 1850. 
 9 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of 
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1012-15 (2014) (noting potential for 
richer periodic narrative messages to shareholders, along with related structural changes); Rock, supra note 
xx (noting Buffett’s influential letters). 
 10 See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and Political 
Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 144-145 (2014) (robust 
discussions at regular corporate meetings can shape the shareholder base); see also Rock, supra note 3, at 
904-05; compare Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 842 (relative appeal of annual meetings depends on topics 
discussed). 
 11 See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L. J. 845 (2005); Belinfanti, supra 
note 4. 
 12  See Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty, and the Law, 68 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 15, 41-50 (1999) (noting that spin-offs can be value enhancing for shareholders); York Schnorbus, 
Tracking Stock in Germany: Is German Corporate Law Flexible Enough To Adopt American Financial 
Innovations?, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 541 (2001) (tracking stocks enhance shareholder value). 
 13 See Ron W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. 
FIN. 1697 (2009); Young Ran (Christine) Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When Dual-
Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE. L. REV. 1, 22-29 (2019); Rock, supra note 3. 
 14 See Dallas, supra note 8. 
 15 See Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors, 25 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86 (2013); Belinfanti, supra note 4. 
 16 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, 63 BYU L. REV. 
--- (forthcoming 2020).  
 17 E.g., Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 
1554 (2015). 
 18 See Emeka Duruigbo, Stimulating Long-Term Shareholding, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1733, 1733 
(2012); Emeka Duruigbo, Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia, 100 KY. L.J. 531 
(2011/2012). 
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explicit attention to relative percentage ownership share ownership of the corporation.19 But none 
addresses relative portfolio concentration at all, whether alone or in combination with time 
horizon.20 The topics addressed in this Article have been chosen generally because of their under-
treatment in this literature and specifically because of their unique appeal to QS, both long-term 
and concentrated.   
B. Today’s Index Dominance    
 In decades past, shareholders seemed to be monolithic. In 1965, for example, institutional 
investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion 
owned by individual households. Managers could view individual stockholders as sharing similar 
interests, principally long-term corporate value, and giving managers broad discretion to pursue it. 
Less than 15% of the market, or $100 billion, was held by the day’s mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and $21 billion 5%, 6%, and 3%).21  The 
appetites of such firms did not differ greatly from one another or from the individual investor. 
 Over the past several decades, shareholders have become increasingly diverse and more 
demanding of managers. These range from indexers who buy everything to high-frequency traders 
who flip every minute. Some shareholder activists prescribe strategies for maximum short-term 
shareholder gain through divestitures while socially oriented activists make shareholder proposals 
in the name of environmental, social and governance (ESG) objectives.   
 Several seismic forces contributed to the changed demographics. The broadest was the 
eclipse of individual shareholders by institutional investors. Since 2016, institutions have held the 
vast majority of the $30+ trillion in total market capitalization, with mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies together commanding a decisive majority (respectively, $9.1 trillion, 
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion).22  
 Among institutions, three critical changes have occurred in recent decades. In the context 
of the shareholder cultivation literature, the most important has been the substantial shortening of 
average holding periods, indicative of increased trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies, and 
other short-term drivers. Average holding periods they shortened significantly from the mid-1960s 
through the early 2000;23 while the average has held steady since, this appears to be due to how 
the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent holdings of the indexers.24 Best-
 
 19 E.g., Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 829 (referencing twenty percent ownership level without 
triggering shareholder vote under state corporate law or registration under federal securities law). 
 20 One exception is Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, supra note 16. 
 21 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States: 
Historical Annual Tables (1965-1974).  
 22 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States: 
Historical Annual Tables (2005-2015), at;  123 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/annuals/a2005-2015.pdf; Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States, Second Quarter 2018 at 130, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20180920/z1.pdf.   
 23 Anne M. Tucker, The Long and The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment 
Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581 (2018). 
 24 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, at n. 42 (2018). 
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selling author, Michael Lewis, dramatized the stakes in his 2014 book, Flash Boys, and the pace 
of acceleration continues with sustained technological advances in computing algorithms, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning.25 
 Related to the issue of short-termism has been the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies 
have roamed corporate America since the Gilbert brothers popularized the practice in the 1950s.26 
And from the 1970s through the 1990s, incumbent managers always faced constant threats to 
corporate control from rival firms, takeover artists, and colorful raiders such as Carl Icahn and 
Nelson Peltz.27 But it is only in the past two decades that a vast pool of capital developed among 
specialty firms, dubbed shareholder activists, dedicated to the practice featuring a well-developed 
playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and repeat players such as Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb and 
Paul Singer.28 
 Yet while the shareholder cultivation literature has considered time horizon—including 
among activism—the foremost demographic change has been neglected: the large and growing 
percentage of shares are held by indexers. Indexing, popularized by the late Jack Bogle, was a 
marginal practice through the 1990s, but today is a familiar approach. His company, Vanguard, is 
a household name. Large indexers command trillions of assets, representing one-quarter to one-
third or more of total U.S. public company equity. In 1997, less than 8% of mutual funds were 
indexed, whereas today more than 40% are.   
 A substantial literature is emerging to address the rise of indexers, but mainly to debate 
whether their influence is too great or how they perform their oversight functions.29 There has been 
no discussion of this cohort in the shareholder cultivation literature. In one way, that’s 
unsurprising: indexers need no cultivation or enticing since they buy every stock in the index. 
Indeed, to the extent concern rivets on short-termism, indexers may receive a critical pass, as they 
are generally long-term holders (subject to forced sales due to rebalancing). On the other hand, the 
omission is glaring, since the more indexers own the less room there is for quality.  Quality 
shareholders are congenial to private corporations and public policy alike.    
C. Advantages of Quality  
  Each shareholder segment adds unique value: activists promote management 
accountability; index funds enable millions to enjoy market returns at low cost; and traders offer 
liquidity.  With such advantages, however, come disadvantages: activists becoming overzealous; 
 
 25 See Tom C. W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 
(2019).  
 26 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings: From Populist 
to Virtual, FIN. HIS. (Fall 2018). 
 27 See KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 
1988).  
 28 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON & JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY, INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 1-38 (2015). 
 29 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2019) (agency cost indictment of indexer 
capability) with Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: 
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2019) [hereinafter Fisch, The New 
Titans] (ringing theoretical defense of indexer capability).  
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indexers lacking resources to understand specific company details; and traders inducing a short-
term focus. Quality shareholders balance the base, and counteract these downsides. 
 As to curbing overzealous activism, QS can be white squires—a term dating to the 1980s 
referring to block shareholders tending to support management.30 When a board perceives activist 
excess, it helps to have a few large long-term owners to consult. As a united front, the company’s 
hand is strengthened, resisting excess while addressing legitimate concerns activist may have.31    
 Quality shareholders study company specifics which indexers, being stretched thin, 
cannot.32 Indexers may be good at analyzing dynamic issues as they arise, but rarely develop deep 
knowledge that QS command.  Indexers invest most of their limited resources to develop views 
about what is best generally in corporate governance, not what is best for particular companies.  
 Quality shareholders differ from both activists and indexers regarding director elections. 
Activists nominate directors, fellow board members often resist, and indexers almost never 
nominate directors at all. QS offer a supply of outstanding directors for their investees, often 
themselves.33  
 Being long-term, QS offset the short-term preferences of transients. A high density of QS, 
with their characteristic patience, helps managers operate strategically, with a long-term outlook.34 
Such effects can percolate throughout a company. If less pressure comes from shareholders to 
produce short-term results, then directors, officers, employees, suppliers, strategic partners and 
others can operate in the same manner.35 
 Shareholder cohorts have different preferences about the price levels of stocks they own. 
Transients generally prefer the highest price possible for maximum profit on immediate sale; 
indexers favor the highest reasonable price because they assume, consistent with efficient market 
theory, that price and value are substantially the same; and QS, generally uninterested in an 
immediate sale and attune to stock market volatility, prefer a stock price that bears the most rational 
relationship possible to the company’s intrinsic business value.36 (At purchase, of course, QS seek 
prices below value.)37 
 Many managers tend to likewise prefer the highest possible stock price, perceiving it as a 
 
 30 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 31 See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A Case 
Study, HARV. GOV. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2019). 
 32 See infra Part III for aspects of the related debate.  
 33 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2 (Chapter 3). 
 34 See Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, S. Trevis Certo & Michael A. Hitt, Marching to the Beat 
of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions, 53 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. (2010) (finding positive association between high density of quality shareholders and strategic 
management decision making). 
 35 CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2 (chapter 3). 
 36 See WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: 
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA (5th ed. 2019) 38. 
 37 BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR. 
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measure of their own performance, the higher the better.38 But while they often complain that their 
company’s stock price is too low, under- and over-pricing are equally likely and neither is 
desirable.39  
 A share price that is rationally related to business value can be a huge asset for several 
purposes, including making acquisitions, compensating employees, and facilitating fairly priced 
gains (or losses) when shareholders must sell.40 While there is a lively debate over the degree of 
such market efficiency—of how well price approximates value—companies with the closest 
nexus enjoy clear advantages over those with the widest gaps.  Evidence suggests that companies 
with ownership dominated by QS tend to enjoy stock prices that are less volatile and more 
rationally related to business value.41   
 Above all, a company’s shareholder mix can influence corporate behavior and 
performance. Patient shareholders invite managers to invest in long-term projects promising high 
returns on invested capital; short-term traders stimulate activities that translate into increases in 
quarterly earnings per share. Shareholders with large stakes relative to the rest of a company’s 
shares determine the level of managerial accountability through majoritarian voting traditions. 
Those with large stakes relative to their other investments tend to be more engaged, epitomized by 
hedge fund activists. 
 There is a correlation between stock price performance and QS density. For instance, in 
related research, I first identified the leading QS measured by patience and concentration during 
the five-year period from 2014-2018 and used that to identify the companies that attract this cohort 
in the highest density over that period.42 Then I compared a portfolio comprised of the 25 
companies at the top of the QS density and 25 companies at the bottom of the QS density. The 
high QS density portfolio outperformed the low QS density portfolio in each of the five years.  
 There is also evidence that the patient-concentrated strategy associated with QS can enable 
this cohort to outperform investment markets systematically. Conventional wisdom—and 
considerable research—challenged claims that individual stock picking strategies can 
systematically outperform index benchmarks, at least after fees.43 However, changes in 
 
 38 See BARUCH LEV, WINNING INVESTORS OVER: SURPRISING TRUTHS ABOUT HONESTY, 
EARNINGS GUIDANCE, AND OTHER WAYS TO BOOST YOUR STOCK PRICE 103-105 (2014). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See BUFFETT & CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS, supra note 36, at 38 (Berkshire’s owner-related 
business principles, number 14). 
 41 See Paul Borochin & Jie Yang, The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation 
and Governance, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score model for identify 
quality shareholders). Other recent research affirms other advantages that long-term investors 
contribute to companies they invest in.  See Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality 
Shareholders(footnote citing Jarrad Hartford etc.) 
 42 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Quality Outperforms: Evidence on Portfolios of Companies with 
Relative Densities of Quality Shareholders (draft in circulation summer/fall 2020). 
 43 See Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund 
Performance, 65 J. FIN. 915 (2010) (while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for 
customers after fees); Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57 (1997) 
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shareholder demographics during the past two decades, including increased competition and lower 
fees, produced a new strand of research challenging these conventional views.44 
 For instance, there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent 
index;45 some top-performance records do persist;46 and a sizable cohort of managers with 
particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.47 Among those traits are conviction and  
II. CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS 
 The shareholder cultivation literature extensively discusses communications strategies as 
ways to sculpt a shareholder base. The tendency is to orient disclosure toward attracting long-term 
shareholders. There is substantial criticism of short-term reporting, especially against quarterly 
earnings reports, forecasts and calls.48 After all, disclosure focused on short-term goals in 
disclosure may attract short-term biased investors.49 The literature notes the potential for securities 
regulations to backfire in this regard, when prescribing increased disclosure that overemphasizes 
short-term horizons.50   
 More generally, the shareholder cultivation literature on disclosure portrays proxy 
statements and other formal communications as an opportunity to educate shareholders.51  Related 
messaging can be tailored as much as possible to attract or repel shareholders defined in various 
ways, whether time horizon, relative concentration, or otherwise. That includes the relative 
appetite for socially oriented investors who would find ESG-based integrated reporting 
appealing.52  
 Financial disclosure can serve in the same way.  Managers who provide the numbers that 
really matter, rather than just generic earnings metrics, are likely to attract shareholders with an 
analytical appetite.53    
 
(finding that the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund 
portfolio managers”). 
 44 See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional Wisdom 
on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively Managed Mutual 
Funds, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 8 (2019). 
 45 Jonathan Berk & Jules van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 118 J. FIN. 
ECON. (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. 
FIN. ECON. 147 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill, 
Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 N. AM. J. ECON. FIN. 222 (2017). 
 46 Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 569 (2005); Robert Kowoski, Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual 
Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551 (2006). 
 47 Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 667 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009). 
 48 Dallas, supra note 8, at 560; Rock, supra note 3, at 870. 
 49 Rodrigues, supra note 6, at 1850. 
 50 Id.     
 51 Rock, supra note 3, at 870. 
 52 Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 856. 
 53 Hu, supra note 7, at 403. 
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 While the shareholder cultivation literature’s treatment of communications strategies is 
accordingly rich, this Part fortifies it in numerous ways. First, it treats two topics the literature has 
almost entirely overlooked: annual meetings and shareholder letters, of particular interest not 
merely to the long-term shareholder but to the concentrated one. Second, it reorients two topics—
the quarterly communications and reporting accounting information—as corollaries and presents 
a third topic—stock splits—as a corporate communications strategy, being a signal about 
managerial expectations rather than, as conventionally presented, part of dividend policy.  In each 
case, the discussion includes historical context along with contemporary utility.   
A.  Annual Meetings  
 At most companies, the annual meeting is a perfunctory affair, with a two-hour meeting 
considered lengthy.54 While time is usually allotted for shareholder questions, the “questions” 
often seem more like pet peeves than probes of company strategy and prospects. Those responding 
tend to focus narrowly or literally on the particular questions, rather than listening for clues about 
wider shareholder concerns that create opportunities to educate shareholders about the company’s 
strategy and prospects. 
 But it doesn’t have to be that way, and scores of companies buck the boring approach, in 
part to entice QS. They offer videos, product samples, lengthy Q&As, educational programs, and 
more. In a few cases, additional events surround the meeting, such as separate meetings of major 
subsidiaries or breakout sessions with key managers.  As New Yorker columnist John Brooks 
reported, annual meetings “bring companies to life.”55 QSs relish this. 
 1. History. Before the 1930s, annual shareholder meetings were perfunctory legal affairs 
that achieved little and attracted few. Amid rising individual share ownership, a vocal group of 
gadflies, led by the brothers John and Lewis Gilbert, spent the next four decades making meetings 
matter.  
 By the early 1960s across corporate America, up to ten annual meetings drew more than 
1,000; two dozen between 300 and 900; and AT&T, boasting millions of shareholders, set the era’s 
record at 12,000 attendees. A 1964 New York Times story proclaimed: “the vociferous minority 
shareholders helped popularize meetings by their persistent attendance and their keen questioning 
on controversial matters.” 
 In the early 1970s, a movement to abandon the annual meeting flickered fleetingly.  In 
1972, Delaware, leading state of incorporation for public companies, updated its law to let 
shareholders act by written consent rather than at meetings. In a New York Times op-ed, J.B. Fuqua, 
of Fuqua Industries, advocated for abolition, in favor of voting by mail.  
 But shareholders overwhelmingly pushed back and stock exchanges ruled that the consent 
method did not meet their requirement to have an annual meeting. By 1975, the abolition 
movement was dead, wryly judged by The New York Times as “notably unsuccessful.”   
 That same year, Warren Buffett began building what would become the most popular 
annual shareholder meeting, at Berkshire Hathaway. In 1975, a dozen attended in an Omaha office 
 
 54 See Robert E. Denham, The Shareholders You Deserve, in LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & 
STEPHANIE CUBA, THE WARREN BUFFETT SHAREHOLDER: STORIES FROM INSIDE THE BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWAY ANNUAL MEETING (2018), p. 171. 
 55 John Brooks, Stockholder Season, THE NEW YORKER (October 8, 1966). 
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cafeteria, but then for the next three decades added a digit—hundreds by 1985, thousands by 1995, 
and tens of thousands by 2005. In 2018, more than 40,000 attended, the record for a U.S. public 
company. 
  While the Berkshire meeting’s main feature has long been a six-hour Q&A with Buffett 
and vice chairman Charlie Munger, it has evolved into a long-weekend extravaganza. The 
company for decades has hosted events on the days surrounding the meeting—a Friday night ball 
game, Saturday evening cookout, Sunday champagne brunch—and shareholders have added their 
own conferences, panels, and parties that alone draw hundreds or thousands. It is a series of 
energetic scenes of engaged QSs.56 
 Markel Corporation hosts an impressive annual meeting in its hometown of Richmond, 
Virginia—but also hosts a separate gathering, drawing some 1,300 shareholders in Omaha during 
the weekend of the Berkshire meeting. Detecting overlap in both shareholders and values, CEO 
Tom Gayner began the tradition in 1985, when he was a junior insurance manager. A half dozen 
joined him. Gayner has continued to lead the event since.    
 2. Evolution. From 1980 through 2010, ownership of public company equity shifted from 
individuals to institutions. With that shift, companies increasingly communicated to shareholders 
throughout the year, always at regular quarterly intervals and often more frequently, approaching 
a model of continuous disclosure. 
 While ownership and communication changed, the annual meeting remained a staple of 
corporate life, an important opportunity for shareholders— both individuals and representatives of 
institutions—to meet management, pose questions, press issues and resolve debate.  
 But if the prior era’s annual meetings stressed individual shareholders and associated 
“democratic” rights, this one increasingly brought out corporate identity and culture. For example, 
Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, from 1984 until its sale to Unilever in 2000, attracted a crew of socially 
responsible owners to a meeting that looked more like Woodstock than Wall Street. 
 Held among cattle farms near Burlington, Vermont, the founders ran the meeting 
informally, weaving in the vocabulary of hippies: Jerry Greenfield, one of the founders, might 
intone, “Hey, man, time for a little Q&A.” If Ben Cohen made a motion, in unison a chorus could 
be heard paraphrasing Smokey Robinson, singing “I second that motion.”57  
 The company’s commitment to sustainable profitability, and social responsibility through 
charitable giving, resonated with this group. Pressed by critics on board authority to allocate 
corporate profits to charitable causes, Ben Cohen, Greenfield’s partner, explained: 
We’ve never taken a formal vote of all the shareholders, but at our annual meetings, 
I usually ask them—just a show of hands, it’s nonbinding—if they support the 
company’s supporting the community and giving away what are really their profits. 
And they’re all in favor of it. 
 
 56 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM & STEPHANIE CUBA, THE WARREN BUFFETT SHAREHOLDER: 
STORIES FROM THE BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY ANNUAL MEETING (2018) (illuminating essays by forty 
denizens of the Berkshire shareholder meeting). 
 57 See RANDY CEPUCH, A WEEKEND WITH WARREN BUFFETT AND OTHER SHAREHOLDER 
MEETING ADVENTURES (2007). 
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The Ben & Jerry’s annual meeting helped to communicate the company’s brand, attracting both 
consumers and like-minded shareholders, forging enduring loyalties. Moreover, it was achieved at 
low cost and produced high returns.  
 Another mighty American town, Fayetteville, Arkansas, has been the scene of the Walmart 
stockholders’ meeting, most distinctive because of its conscious focus on employees, many of 
whom are also shareholders. Founder Sam Walton hosted the first Walmart Stores annual meeting 
in 1970 at a coffee shop with five other people. Since the 1980s, the meetings have added special 
events and celebrity guests drawing large crowds. The venue has moved from the headquarters 
auditorium to University of Arkansas arenas now seating 20,000. 
 Walmart executives bound onto stage under flashes of light, met with roars of crowd 
approval. Managers get the crowd to spell out Walmart, declare that the store is “number one” and 
proclaim their love of the brand. Though Walmart remains an economic powerhouse serving its 
shareholders well, its identity is in its employees, whom it affectionately calls “associates.” The 
annual meeting is their centerpiece.  
  The annual meeting can be a place where shareholders see the human face of a company 
and its culture.  They meet the chairman, operating and executive teams, and even the board. 
During his tenure at DuPont, CEO and chairman, Chad Holliday, would wander up and down the 
aisles, shaking hands with shareholders in a show of savvy but human leadership.58 Directors 
usually attend shareholders meeting and are introduced to the crowd. In some cases, they are asked 
to play additional roles, from serving as emcee to introducing themselves and given their 
backgrounds.  
 At some annual meetings, companies offer freebies to shareholders, as at Tootsie Roll. 
Product samples from Ben & Jerry’s ice cream are given out at Unilever meetings, box lunches 
are served at Marks & Spencer and British Petroleum.59 These gestures keep those attending happy 
and entices their return. Successful shareholder meetings tend to draw more people every year—
as a company prospers and word spreads.   
 3. Future.  Executives who have perfected the practice of the live annual meeting may have 
a competitive advantage as companies migrate to the virtual approach, both voluntarily and thanks 
to the coronavirus that drove almost annual meetings to virtual format from the second quarter of 
2020. 
 Authorization to host virtual-only shareholder meetings was first enacted in 2000 by 
Delaware corporate law. Today, most state corporate laws permit the practice as well.60 In the first 
decade, a smattering of smaller companies opted in. During this period, a few big names publicly 
evaluated the virtual-only option. Among these, a half dozen opted against doing so after hearing 
negative feedback from shareholders, while another half dozen went forward, despite negative 
feedback.  
 Notably, the companies who went forward tend to enjoy a relatively higher QS density than 
those pulling back. Among those adhering to live meetings are several in the top quarter in 
 
58 Id., p. 120. 
 59 See CEPUCH, supra note 57, at 190-191. 
 60 Both federal and stock exchange rules defer to state law on the manner of holding annual 
meetings. 
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attracting QSs: Conoco Phillips, Symantec and Union Pacific. Among those who went virtual yet 
remain adept at attracting QSs: Comcast, Duke Energy, Intel, and PayPal.61  
 Proponents cite several advantages for virtual-only shareholder meetings, which opponents 
counter. Advantages are lower costs, potentially increasing the number of shareholders tuning in, 
and a cost-benefit framework that stresses that few attend and little occurs. Opponents counter that 
such features are not inevitable, as many managers have harnessed the shareholder meeting as a 
productive forum for all. Poor turnout and banality are managers’ fault and more a sign of a 
problem to be fixed than a rationale for further dilution, critics say.  
 Another general argument holds that institutional owners cannot attend all the meetings 
where they own stock because their portfolios are so diversified, and having the ability to tune-in 
increases coverage. This argument may be especially compelling for indexers owning stock in 
hundreds or thousands of companies without the staff to attend most of them.  But this seems more 
a critique of indexing than of live meetings. In any event, at current staffing levels of indexers, 
they would not be able to attend a great many meetings even if all were virtual.   
 But whatever relative appeal exists in the merits of live versus virtual meetings, the 
pandemic reality warrants increased investment in the quality of virtual meetings. For the sake of 
attracting QS, the virtual event remains the sole opportunity for managers and directors to connect 
with shareholders and shareholders to get acquainted managers and directors. Such a special 
opportunity should not be overlooked.  
B.  Shareholder Letters 
 An artfully-drafted shareholder letter provides insights into a company’s values, culture, 
and outlook. It is the forum of greatest freedom for CEO expression, as the letter is both optional 
and unregulated. It is therefore the ideal place for the CEO to convey both individual and corporate 
personality. They reassure current shareholders by reiterating corporate values, reintroducing 
management personalities, and reflecting the corporate trajectory. These communications are an 
excellent tool in attracting QSs.    
 One reason the shareholder letter provides an excellent way to cultivate quality is that so 
many CEOs simply don’t bother with them—those who try have an automatic competitive 
advantage.  Even across companies offering such letters, only a minority of companies archive 
them on their web sites. Among those that are readily accessible, analysts who have read large 
samplings attest that only a handful are worth reading—fewer than three percent by one estimate.62  
 Scan surveys of the best shareholder letters—either a search of published materials or a 
poll at an investor gathering—and the same names keep coming up. Observers, however, give high 
marks to shareholder letters for different reasons.  
 
 61 The assertions in this paragraph rank companies involved in public discussions of the format of 
their annual meeting in relation to CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, at App. A (QS 
Density Ranking).  
 62 Elizabeth J. Howell-Hanano, Pearls of Wisdom: The Best Shareholder Letters Nobody Is 
Reading, TOPTAL (November 7, 2017) (study of all companies in the S&P 600 small cap index).   
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 For example, many rankings of the “best” shareholder letters score general clarity; some 
run algorithms searching for linguistic cues across the continuum from candid to obfuscating.63  
Some investors view shareholders letters as a screen for prospective investments to supplement 
more typical analytical filters.64    
 Single letters taken in isolation are less meaningful than the arc over many years. Quite a 
few CEOs have written one great letter but the best keep it up year after year. Studying the letters 
of a large number of companies over a long period of time yields valuable guidance for 
shareholders and managers alike.   
 A common theme: growing into the letters. The best letters are those of the experienced 
leader—outstanding executives tend to develop in the job, and get better with engagement.  CEOs 
should not get discouraged: writing shareholder letters can be difficult at first, but it tends to get 
easier with passing years.    
 Many CEOs find support in the letter-writing from other members of their team. Some 
CEOs share the burdens and joys of letter writing with colleagues. Yet others have gained 
inspiration by making their letters into a company pitch. They target not only QSs but outline 
acquisition criteria and even advertise the company’s products. As an additional opportunity, there 
is no better place than the shareholder letter to include a pitch to prospective business partners and 
sellers.  
 Another feature of outstanding letters is originality, reflecting the personality of the writer 
and culture of the company. QSs know the difference between legitimate emulation and mindless 
copycatting. The best letters—as with any kind of writing—are those written with sincerity and 
passion. Above all, the Golden Rule of shareholder letters: Buffett says he writes to provide 
shareholders information he would want to have if their “positions were reversed.”  
 A degree of repetition is valuable—especially on enduring core values and practices.  One 
endearing feature of many letters for QSs are core principles that do not change. Such a firm belief 
system is valuable to QSs—whatever happens in the world, they know the company stays true to 
its values. Such statements are therefore worthy of repetition.     
 Consistency is a virtue, especially in presenting figures and charts. As data lovers, QSs 
appreciate substantial historical figures. Many shareholder letters feature such information, at least 
a decade, some going back multiple decades and one nearly a century (Genuine Parts Company, 
from 1928).  
 When authors introduce new metrics and charts, they explain their utility. If omitting data 
in one year that appeared previously, the writer must explain why. Readers who need to hunt to 
see if goalposts have changed may instead change their views on the company’s appeal.  
 
63 See LAURA RITTENHOUSE, INVESTING BETWEEN THE LINES: HOW TO MAKE SMARTER 
DECISIONS BY DECODING CEO COMMUNICATIONS (2013). 
 64 See Eric R. Heyman, What You Can Learn From Shareholder Letters, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION 
OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS (October 2010) (recommending studying a company’s shareholder letter with 
as much care as its financials, looking for general adequacy of explanations spanning from financial 
strength to addressing economic challenges). 
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 One expert on the shareholder letter, Laura Rittenhouse, stresses that reading the best letters 
can “boost your strategic IQ and your investment returns.” relative candor and clarity. In a recent 
annual ranking, Rittenhouse designated the top 25 by her measures, the vast majority of which 
rank among the highest in terms of attracting QS. Table 5-B lists these 20 companies.65    
 
C. Quarterly Reticence  
 While quarterly conference calls have been a staple of corporate life for decades, as 
structured today they are not congenial forums to draw many QSs or communicate useful 
information. When held for the purpose of providing quarterly forecasts, they can pose serious 
side-effects. They can make CFOs resemble gold rush prospectors in Mark Twain’s definition of 
a mine: “a mine is a hole in the ground with a liar standing over it.” Therefore, many companies 
are considering alternatives. Let’s review the debate. 
 1. Forecasts.  Begin with the quarterly forecast. For one, there is no legal requirement that 
companies publicly predict upcoming performance. The practice of providing “quarterly 
guidance” began to spread in the 1980s and 1990s after decades when such forecasting was 
illegal.66  Securities laws forbade prognostications for several reasons, primarily that such 
predictions are given undue credence and create perverse incentives to reach them.  
 Once permitted, forecasting proliferated, largely in response to appetites of financial 
analysts. They are genuinely hungry for analytical grist such guidance provides, as it helps them 
make their own forecasts.   
 While proponents of quarterly forecasting continue to assert that more management 
reporting is an inexorable good, that group is becoming the minority. Most observers now 
recognize that the drawbacks of quarterly management forecasts far outweigh the benefits.   
 First, even if more information might generally be better (contestable, given today’s 
information overload), forecasts are not information. They are predictions and guesses.  Given the 
vicissitudes of business, no one can be highly confident in them, no matter how carefully 
developed. 
 No business operates in a predictable environment and most face considerable volatility 
risk. Take examples from two very different industries showing the many risk factors that come 
into play. A shipping company must worry about docking and repairing vessels, moving deep-
water drilling rigs, responding to hurricanes, and cleaning up oil spills; a media company must 
work through news cycles, election waves, sporting events, and financial gyrations.67  
 Second, it takes enormous time and effort to develop quarterly estimates, diverting 
managerial resources from other important business. Three-month forecasts draw attention and 
focus to current quarterly outcomes, away from ensuing quarters, years, or decades. As the 
 
 65 See Rittenhouse Rankings Press Release, Companies Excelling in Rittenhouse Candor 
Analytics™ Substantially Outperform the Market in 2016 (December 13, 2016); CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY 
SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, at App. A (QS Density Ranking). 
 
66 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud: Fantastic Futures versus 
Conservative Histories, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 789 (2005). 
 67 These points are inspired by the shareholder letters by Charles Fabrikant of SEACOR and Don 
Graham of The Washington Post Co.  
17 
 
managers at Loews quipped “we attach a much greater priority to generating superior stock price 
performance over the next twelve years than over any single twelve-month period.”68 
 Third, quarterly estimates become both goals and a test. Internal goal-setting is necessary 
to measure and motivate managers. But by publicizing forecasts, managers strive for those targets 
instead, creating perverse incentives. 
 Finally, a quarterly focus tempts imprudent spending cuts.69 At Unilever, for instance, such 
a focus led to reducing research, technology and investments. This form of earnings management 
can have disastrous effects, from distorting internal decision making to snowballing into 
accounting irregularities or even financial fraud.  
 Recent trends point to a decline in quarterly forecasting. As few as one in five public 
companies maintains the practice, many out of sheer habit, though there has been a modest uptick 
in the percentage in recent years.70  
 Yet even if convinced by proponents, one thing is clear: QSs oppose quarterly guidance. 
They prefer managers to focus on the long-term economics of a business, not short-run accounting 
results.    
 None of this is to say that quarterly results do not matter. Often, they matter a great deal, 
which is why law requires public companies to publish quarterly results. It’s also why some 
companies, while skipping guidance, nevertheless still host quarterly conference calls.  The key 
point, however, is to avoid letting quarterly events—reports, calls, or guidance—replace long-term 
thinking.  
 A recent study found that companies who quit forecasting came to attract a larger 
proportion of long-term institutional investors.71 Quitting may be difficult over the short-term, and 
those trying to stop face resistance and sometimes even a decline in average ensuing share price. 
But the long-term advantages are strong.  
 3. Calls.  Quarterly conference calls pose similar challenges to quarterly guidance. For one, 
again, neither logic nor law requires such calls. They became staples of corporate life as the forum 
to provide and update quarterly forecasts. Quarterly gatherings pose most of the problems that 
guidance does, though perhaps of smaller magnitude.     
 
 68 Loews letter, 2007.      
69 See John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of 
Corporate Financial Reporting, J. ACC. & ECON. (2005).   
 70  A 2006 article by McKinsey & Co. researchers reported a plateau around 2001 in the number of 
companies maintaining the practice (about 1,200 or 4,000 companies surveyed) accompanied by a steadily 
increasing number of companies ending their former practice of providing quarterly guidance., a figure 
exceeding 200 by 2004. Peggy Hsieh et al, The Misguided Practice of Earnings Guidance, MCKINSEY & 
CO. STRATEGY & CORP. FIN. (March 2006).  On the other hand, data reported in 2017 by S&P Global 
Market Intelligence reported that 146 companies of the S&P 500 provided earnings guidance that year, the 
highest number in a decade.  See Stephen Grocer, Quarterly Guidance, N.Y. TIMES (September 26, 2018).  
71 Yongtae Kim, et al., Does the Cessation of Quarterly Earnings Guidance Reduce Investors’ 
Short-Termism? (2017); see also Shuping Chen, et al, Is Silence Golden? An Empirical Analysis of Firms 
that Stop Giving Quarterly Earnings Guidance in the Post Regulation-FD Period, J. ACC. & ECON. (2011). 
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 But there are potential benefits of hosting a quarterly huddle. Shareholders may have valid 
questions throughout the year worth addressing between annual meetings. Managers may benefit 
from hearing those and thinking them through using a shareholder perspective. In principle, it 
should be possible to arrange such gatherings while keeping short-term pressures in check. One 
step would schedule them as far away from publication of quarterly results as possible, rather than 
as close, which seems to be the common pattern. 
  Prudence would limit discussion to past performance and strategic outlooks, rather than 
forecasting results. It would be a forum where executives educate shareholders to understand the 
business. Managers would reference recent results as briskly as possible, then focus on big-picture, 
long-term goals, like successful product launches, opening new markets, and gaining market share.  
 There are other issues with the current quarterly conference call. Despite regulatory efforts 
dating back two decades to assure access to all shareholders on these calls (“Regulation FD”), they 
remain dominated by financial analysts whose firms specialize in selling securities, with QSs in 
the quiet minority. While some analyst questions add value, many follow-ups do not, and while 
answers sometimes seem useful, many seem guarded or superficial or simply reference published 
materials. 
 Technology is also being used to erode the value of the quarterly conference call.  High-
frequency traders use artificial intelligence to conduct sentiment analysis while calls are in 
progress. The procedure interprets the call’s tone and messaging in real-time and directs instant 
trading decisions throughout the session. The goal is to profit from a few seconds worth of 
“advance knowledge.” 
 4. Better Ways.  For managers and shareholders who hope to stay connected and engaged 
year-round there are a number of alternatives.  The two most common alternatives are direct 
meetings and written questions; less common are formal shareholder liaisons.     
 Companies are increasingly turning away from quarterly calls in favor of the periodic 
written Q&A. Companies invite shareholders to email written questions, managers prepare 
responses, and all are posted at times calculated to minimize any market effects. Posts are indexed 
and searchable on company websites. 
 An online Q&A can address questions from any source, not only shareholders, so long as 
the source is disclosed. For instance, executives might scour reliable internet sites, such as Reddit, 
to address the most frequently posed questions. To be more proactive, a company could crowd 
source questions from shareholders.  
 Some companies are willing to host direct meetings between shareholders and managers 
or even directors. Securities laws limit the scope of company disclosure to public information 
(under Regulation FD, if nonpublic information is disclosed to one shareholder it must be 
disclosed to all). But that still leaves ample room for productive talk.  
 Shareholders may be interested in engaging with independent directors, which can be 
conveniently done around the time of the annual meeting over lunch or dinner. Take care that 
directors interacting with shareholders are trained to know the scope of information that is 
allowable for discussion under securities laws. If there is any doubt, they should err on the side of 
silence. The boundaries should be delineated to the attending shareholders ahead of time. 
 Veterans of the process suggest a few guidelines, with varying degrees of flexibility 
designed to promote productive exchange rather than straitjacket the initiative: (1) a stated policy 
19 
 
concerning timing, topics, and shareholder participants; (2) a set of criteria to determine which 
directors participate; (3) an outline of goals or objectives for the gatherings; (4) coordination 
between directors and executives; and (5) legal compliance standards to avoid impermissible 
disclosures.72  
 Such discussions highlight shareholder concerns as well as reiterate what attracted them to 
the company in the first place. Shareholders size up directors and vice versa.  Conversation helps 
identify areas of contentment as well as room for improvement.   
  Whether to engage should be in the discretion of directors. Many energetically oppose the 
idea, while others are game. Opponents see the outreach as investor relations, not the board’s job; 
supporters see it as part of corporate governance, where the director-shareholder relationship is 
central. Likewise, some CEOs will support the outreach while others recoil at the prospect.  
 For those interested in a more formal and routinized approach, a shareholder liaison 
committee can appeal. Common among large listed French companies, these representatives 
regularly meet with the board of directors. On their websites, companies such as BNP Paribas and 
Air Liquide publish the names of the liaison committees and topics of discussion. They state that 
any shareholder can become a candidate for the committee, whose members typically serve three-
year terms.  
 Board meeting agendas occasionally include time for the shareholder liaison committee. 
Ground rules vary: the one-way approach permits the board to ask the shareholders questions but 
not vice versa whereas the two-way invites dialogue. The exchange of ideas can be productive, 
and certainly to research and act on questions concerning shareholders. While QS regard quarterly 
guidance and forecasts as unnecessary, a dialogue is always valuable.  
D. Accounting Information  
 Financial reporting offers numerous alternative snapshot figures to portray business 
performance and condition. Among alternative performance metrics are economic profit, book 
value, and return on equity or invested capital. QSs appreciate explanations for which is 
preferred—and also insist on consistency in sticking with the same measure over the years, not 
picking and choosing depending on which looks best in any given year.  
 Consistency is important because, at almost any company in any given year, there is almost 
always a metric out there which can portray positive results.  metrics portray something positive. 
Choosing the assertions that provide silver linings is tempting—better accounts receivable 
turnover despite sluggish sales, faster inventory turns despite production problems, reduced debt 
despite greater reduction in equity.  
 Companies attract and keep QSs by having the courage to report the same items about the 
same core sources of value creation year in and year out, whether positive, negative or neutral.  
QSs want the entire picture.  Whatever metric is chosen, the methodology and rationale must be 
explained. 
 Economic profit is an example, of great appeal to QS. It is an honest picture of 
performance, taking into account multiple factors, including the cost of equity capital. One of the 
 
72 See Lex Suvanto, Should Boards of Directors Communicate With Shareholders?, IR MAGAZINE 
(January 2015). 
20 
 
pioneers of using economic profit was Roberto Goizueta, CEO of The Coca-Cola Company. He 
began using this measure in 1993, as reported in his ensuing 1994 letter to shareholders, presenting 
this is as a central performance metric:  
 We now evaluate our business units and opportunities based primarily on 
their ability to generate attractive economic profit, not just growth in revenues or 
earnings. We define economic profit as net operating profit after taxes, less a charge 
for the average cost of the capital employed to produce that profit. That shift in 
evaluation methodology prompted us to begin divesting ourselves of businesses 
with financial characteristics inferior to the remarkable fundamentals of our core 
soft drink business. 
 Companies who take economic profit seriously tend to attract QS. While only a dozen such 
companies, and all but one is in the top third of companies measured by relative density of QSs. 
Besides Coca-Cola and Credit Acceptance, these companies include Clorox, Crown Holdings, 
International Flavors, and Lear Corporation.73  
 1. Perspectives and Adjusted Metrics.  It is the rare corporate executive who believes that 
thoroughgoing compliance with GAAP (or IFRS) produces a faithful economic statement of 
performance and results. That’s why virtually all managers supplement their reports with adjusted 
and alternative metrics that, they believe, more faithfully reflect economic reality, whether 
economic profit or any of dozens of other refinements.  
 While managers must explain the accounting results, most QSs also appreciate 
accounting’s inherent limitations. They welcome a CEO’s analysis of supplemental metrics and 
particularly the CEO’s views of how the economics differ from the accounting.     
 The need for adjusted metrics and analysis may be isolated to a one-time event or may 
recur, spanning from a single acquisition to debate over annual amortization of intangibles. The 
shareholder letter is an excellent place to explain the company’s and CEO’s view, ideally in plain 
enough language for general understanding. 
 Perhaps the most recurring challenge in accounting, and its relation to economics, is the 
difference between accounting earnings and various formulations of economic earnings, such as 
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). While volumes are 
devoted to this topic, CEOs must explain the specific thinking of how these measures fit the 
company’s particular circumstances.   
 Berkshire supplements its reports with a concept Buffett calls “owner earnings” for its 
acquired businesses, rather than rely solely on GAAP operating earnings or cash flow. Cash flows 
are commonly calculated as (a) GAAP operating earnings plus (b) depreciation expense and other 
non-cash charges.  
 
 73 The assertions in this paragraph are based on a search of all 10K reports from 1996 through 2018. 
The term “economic profit” appeared 641 times, in filings of some 200 different companies.  Limiting the 
search to those companies with at least seven instances, twenty companies appeared—half continuing to 
use the term through the present and the other half using it having ceased using it at some point in the recent 
past. See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2. 
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 But Buffett’s owner earnings calculation subtracts one element: (c) required reinvestment 
in the business, or “the average amount of capitalized expenditures for plant and equipment, etc., 
that the business requires to fully maintain its long-term competitive position and its unit volume.”   
 Given how common it is for (c) to exceed (b), Buffett’s metric is a more useful 
approximation of economic reality than typical cash flow or GAAP earnings figures. Most 
importantly, Buffett has consistently provided this information and explained the reasoning behind 
it. 
 2. Warning. Despite the utility of non-GAAP measures, some managers and accountants 
abuse the opportunity in order to paint false impressions. An age-old problem, deception through 
non-GAAP reporting became widespread during the 1990s. Lynn Turner, then SEC chief 
accountant, famously quipped that using non-GAAP measures turned many financial reports into 
BS—Turner dubbed it “everything but the bad stuff.” The pervasive problem was a factor in the 
accounting scandals that prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which told the SEC to regulate 
the practice. 
 In response, the SEC’s Regulation G has since required companies using non-GAAP 
measures to reconcile them to the nearest GAAP measure. Also banned were a variety of 
misleading practices that had become all too common, such as excluding various categories of 
expenses. Even so, non-GAAP reporting remained a fraud risk factor, prompting the SEC since 
2013 to police the practice more pro-actively. Over ensuing years, non-GAAP reporting has drawn 
a substantial volume of SEC comment letters to issuers.74  
 One clue is the invention of novel definitions of profit that myopically ignore “bad stuff.” 
While sometimes these are specific to a particular company, the most pernicious practices become 
widespread across an industry or sector. For example, consider contribution margin. This purports 
to show selling price per unit less variable costs per unit—ignoring fixed costs. While potentially 
useful internally to manage a business, fixed costs cannot be ignored.  
 Critics pounced on such tools embraced by companies such as Peleton Interactive, Shake 
Shack, Uber, and WeWork’s parent to exempt expenses such as rent, marketing and stock option 
pay.75 At ride-sharing companies they called it “core platform contribution profit.” It reversed out 
expenses that, while necessary to operate the business and therefore real, did not connect to the 
“core platform.”76  
 At WeWork’s office leasing business, for example, GAAP net income was negative. Under 
a notion called “community-adjusted” earnings, however, a profit was shown by ignoring a variety 
of necessary outlays.  For one, GAAP accounting for leases requires recognizing an expense on a 
straight-line basis over a lease term; but some of WeWork’s leases gave it rent discounts in the 
earlier years of the lease. Wishing to present the economics only of those early years, it opted to 
exclude future rent expense. That’s myopic, not illuminating.  
 
 74 See Seanna Asper, Chris McCoy & Gary K. Taylor, The Expanding Use of Non-GAAP Financial 
Measures Understanding their Utility and Regulatory Limitations, CPA JOURNAL (July 2019). 
 75 See Amanda Iacone, SEC Flags Cash-Flow Measure That Made WeWork Look Profitable, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2019).   
 76 See Howard Schilit, Do Ride-Sharing Customers Sit in Front?, WALL ST. J. (April 28, 2019). 
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   Managers interested in attracting QS present reliable and useful financial information. 
They do not play games with the numbers or their investors. QS are alert to the difference between 
analytical tools and legerdemain, between genuine and fakes, and between the trustworthy and the 
charlatan. 
E. Stock Price and Stock Splits 
 Stock price levels are largely outside the control of corporate issuers, though historically 
boards often influenced the level through devices such as splitting the stock (dividing each share 
into multiple shares with corresponding price reductions per share) or combining it (called a 
reverse stock split, combining multiple shares with corresponding price increases per share).   
 The shareholder cultivation literature explored how such decisions could sculpt the 
shareholder base. According to Professor Rock, stock splits can be used to attract individual 
shareholders if offered when there are high investor valuations on the firms.77  Low stock prices 
may attract investors who buy for non-value reasons—perhaps short-term investors seek to profit 
from erratic price swings. He noted that such effects may be countered by corporate 
communications stressing long-term prospects.78   
 The shareholder cultivation literature concerning stock price and stock splits warrants 
updating to account not only for focusing on QS but also in light of contemporary developments 
affecting the practice of stock splits.  
 Splitting the stock means turning a single share into two or three shares. This increases the 
number of shares outstanding, proportionally cuts the value allocable to each, and drives per share 
price down accordingly.  Splits do not change the company’s total value or per share value but 
only carve the corporate pie into more slices.   
 Historically, stock splits were common and per share prices rarely exceeded $100.  The 
traditional rationales for splitting the stock, and thereby cutting the per share price, were to expand 
the pool of potential buyers and increase market liquidity. At the time, however, stocks had to be 
traded in even lots of 100 or additional fees applied. So pricey stocks translated into large dollar 
order sizes—out of reach for many.   
 But there have always been downsides to stock splits. Side-effects often include increasing 
the market capitalization, despite no change in fundamentals. Yes, the aggregate post-split price 
(the lower price times the greater number of shares) may rise and end up greater than the total pre-
split price, an irrational response attributed to market perceptions that splits signal managerial 
belief in prosperity ahead. While appealing to those preferring a high price no matter what, it’s 
unappealing to QSs, who prefer a price rationally related to value.    
 Today, with the advent of on-line trading, single shares trade without fee premiums, 
making low per share prices less important to individual investors.  If the old-fashioned rationale 
for splits was to entice investors with stronger appetites for more affordable price ranges, that 
reasoning diminished greatly in a world dominated by indexers, which buy stocks without regard 
to price. Moreover, institutional investors, especially index funds who trade in significant volumes 
without regard to price, oppose the increased costs associated with lower-priced shares.   
 The financial crisis of 2008 also fostered changing attitudes on the optics of relative share 
prices. Whereas a low price was previously portrayed as signaling pending prosperity, post-crisis, 
 
 77 Rock, supra note 3, at 881.    
 78 Id. at 880. 
23 
 
a high price became a sign of success. That was particularly true at the depths of the crisis, when 
pervasive low-pricing was a stigma to be overcome, not a sign of good times ahead.  
 For all these reasons, while stock splits were frequent in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
popularity has ebbed. From 2014 to 2019, fewer than 60 splits occurred among S&P 500 
companies, for instance.79  
 That said, there are valid substantive reasons for splitting a stock. A common one is to 
make it easier for shareholders to give gifts of their shares to family or charitable organizations. A 
stockholder owning shares trading at multiples of an intended gift size is handcuffed. Splitting the 
stock to low prices facilitates splicing the gift as the shareholder may desire.   
 Another valid reason is when a company uses its stock to pay for an acquisition. A high-
dollar stock may exceed the value of shares held by some selling shareholders, especially 
employees owning small stakes, who would otherwise be cashed out. Their interest in remaining 
stockholders can be accommodated by splitting the stock to a lower price.  
 For example, if Company A, with a $1000 stock price, pays shares to buy Company B, 
with a $50 stock price, any Company B stockholders owning fewer than 20 shares would be paid 
cash in lieu of fractional shares. This situation arose when Berkshire Hathaway acquired BNSF 
Railway in 2010. It was one reason Berkshire split its class B shares (50-for-1) to enable more 
BNSF employees to continue to own more of their employer’s stock.80 
 An elite group of companies have avoided splitting the stock as price has run to four digits 
and more. Alphabet, having gone public (as Google) in 2004 at around $100 per share, has never 
split its stock, even as it rose above $600 in 2011 and twice that as of this writing. This club of 
four-figure stocks has few members: Amazon, Booking, Markel, NVR, Seaboard and White 
Mountains Insurance. Berkshire’s class A shares take the cake with a six-figure share price. 
 All these companies, not incidentally, rank very high in QS density.81 While causation 
cannot be shown, the philosophy reflected by not splitting pervades the companies, so this cannot 
be dismissed as mere coincidence.   
   A small number of companies boast three-digit share prices—in 2019, there were 37 S&P 
500 stocks priced at $250 per share or more.  Again, there is a positive association between high-
priced stocks and a high-density of QS.  Among the highest price three-digit stocks are the 
following, all of which rank in the top third in terms of attracting QS: AutoZone, Equinix, Intuitive 
Surgical, Mettler-Toledo, and TransDigm.82 
  There is an association between companies with the highest price stocks and high QS 
density. For instance, among the 100 highest priced shares in the S&P 500, more than 1/3 are in 
the highest decile for QS density and well more than ½ are in the top quarter.  Among the names 
 
 79 Matt Krantz, Stock Splits: Out Of Fashion, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (May 16, 2019).   
 80 On the flip side are reverse stock splits. Instead of dividing shares, they are combined and, instead 
of driving a price reduction, price rises. Again, rationales vary, some more shareholder oriented than others.  
 81 See CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, App. A 
 82 This is a complete list of three-digit priced stocks appearing in a list compiled in Matt Krantz, 
Stock Splits: Out Of Fashion, Investor’s Business Daily (May 16, 2019). All rank among the top third in 
Cunningham, QS Density Ranking (described in Appendix A). 
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appearing at the top of both lists: American Tower, Avalon Bay, McCormick, Roper, Stryker, and 
Thermo Fisher Scientific.83 
 While stock splits may once have been useful cultivation tools, as suggested in the 
literature, those days are largely gone. In the case of cultivating quality, a rising stock price appeals, 
rather than one cut through the optical procedure of the stock split. It remains the case, however, 
that stock splits are best seen as part of a communications strategy, and the signals they send are 
unlikely to resonate with QS. 
 
III. SUBSTANCE 
 The shareholder cultivation literature has considered shareholder appetite for dividends, 
and how corporate dividend policy may therefore shape the shareholder base. Common 
conceptions hold that that older and poorer retail investors prefer high dividend yield stocks and 
greet a dividend increase more favorably, but such assertions have a weak empirical 
confirmation.84    
 The literature has investigated the tax-related aspects of dividend policy.  For instance, 
dividends may attract institutional investors whose dividend tax rate is lower than capital gains 
tax.85 Individual investors in high tax brackets have been found to hold dividend-paying stocks.86  
Accordingly, dividend policy can influence the shareholder base in terms of the mix of institutions 
and individuals.87  
 The literature offers innovative uses of dividends. One proposal targeted to lengthening 
investor time horizons would create time-weighted dividends.88 From the funds a board declares 
as a dividend, payments would be proportioned to shares based on their duration of ownership by 
the same shareholder.89  
 The literature also treats share buybacks, often to accompany discussion of dividends.  
Buybacks can attract or repel a variety of shareholders depending on how they are made.  They 
may serve long-term shareholder interests by increasing their allocable share of the corporate pie 
and related claim to earnings.90 That is at least true when the price paid is less than the company’s 
inherent business value, whereas the opposite is too often true. In the case of overpayment, shorter-
term shareholders gain at the expense of longer-term shareholders.91 
 
 83 Source: Author compilation, using S&P data combined with Cunningham, QS Density Ranking 
(described in Appendix A). 
 
 84 Bratton, supra note 11, at 858.  
 85 Rock, supra note 3, at 876. 
 86 Id. 
87 Rock, supra note 3, at 876. 
 88 Belinfanti, supra note 11, at 850. 
 89 Id.  A more ambitious proposal would increase dividends to shareholders who satisfy mission 
standards the corporation would set. Belinfanti, supra note 4, at 851. 
 90 Bratton, supra note 11, at 879. 
 91 Id.; see also Fried, supra note 17 (for adverse effects of share repurchases on long-term holders). 
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 The otherwise robust shareholder cultivation literature, however, has tended to isolate 
discussion of dividends and buybacks without connecting them to equally important issues of 
capital allocation and stock market trading. Concerning capital allocation, the literature has 
overlooked topics such as acquisitions and divestitures—both of great importance to QS and 
warranting treatment along with dividends and buybacks.   
 Finally, the shareholder cultivation literature has devoted considerable attention to the topic 
of stock market listing and related effects—such as liquidity, stock price and stock splits. In this 
case, however, new evidence suggests that this emphasis is not warranted, at least insofar as QS 
are concerned, which exhibit no preference between today’s two dominant—and highly 
competitive—stock exchanges. In fairness, the earlier treatment may prove prescient, and warrants 
updating, in the face of the recent creation of a new U.S. stock exchange, the Long Term Stock 
Exchange.  
A. Capital Allocation  
 Capital allocation is a technical term that denotes simply how corporate dollars are 
invested. Capital can be allocated to many different ends concurrently: fortifying the balance sheet 
by repaying debt or building cash reserves, funding initiatives to maintain or grow existing 
businesses, making acquisitions, buying back shares, or paying dividends. QSs value strong track 
records in capital allocation, measured by return on invested capital. 
 Table 1 presents a framework for thinking about capital allocation and to organize 
discussion.  It is not a directive or road map, as optimal priorities among the depicted choices will 
differ among companies and managers at different times. In fact, the various uses of excess cash 
are neither mutually exclusive nor sequential—funds can be optimally allocated to all uses and 
priorities given to those anywhere on the chart.   
Table 1 Capital Allocation Framework 
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 Start with a general approach to measuring capital allocation effectiveness. First, for any 
given year, calculate the corporation’s average invested capital available. Begin with an estimate 
of the amount of money shareholders have invested. Then, each year, update by adding net income 
and the proceeds of any share issuances, subtracting any dividends, and adjusting for any 
compensation paid in shares.  
 Thereafter, measure overall performance as a return on the average invested capital. For 
example, take net income as a percentage of invested capital (ROIC), as an ultimate measure of 
capital allocation effectiveness.  
 To maximize ROIC on an ongoing basis, measure every corporate project accordingly. 
Track every allocation, including reinvestments and acquisitions, on a project-by-project basis 
using conventional after-tax internal rates of return (IRRs—the rate where the net present value of 
project cash flows are zero). Be sure all company personnel are trained to be familiar with this 
tool. For oversight, have the board periodically set the required hurdle rate for all project types 
(the minimum required IRR to green light the proposed capital allocation).   
 As rigorous as this sounds, beware that IRRs are complex, future oriented, and require 
judgement.  Managers charged with related measurement may naturally tend to overestimate. To 
compensate for this, compute an additional measure of overall annual capital allocation 
effectiveness. Consider one that is simpler, historical and less-judgment laden: add annual ROIC 
to annual growth in organic revenue (not acquired) and compare the sum to the hurdle rate.  The 
tools can be adapted to all of the capital allocation opportunities presented in Table 1. Such an 
approach is an excellent way to attract QSs.  
  1. Reinvestment. While there is fluidity to capital allocation, the first priority ought to 
belong to reinvestment in current businesses to increase competitive advantage. The chief 
concerns for corporate leadership and QSs are managerial rationalizations about the prospects of 
such a use of capital.  Managers are often optimistic, usually a desirable trait in an entrepreneur, 
but not if excessive. Standard measurements, such as IRR and hurdle rates, along with related 
oversight, help keep them in check. 
  Another aspect of reinvestment is fortifying the balance sheet. Companies need sufficient 
liquidity to be prepared for economic distress as well as to take advantage of fruitful opportunities.  
 2. Acquisitions. For acquisitions, the capital allocation test is simple: whether the 
acquisition makes current shareholders wealthier on a per-share basis. That means paying a price 
less than the target company’s stand-alone value, ideally delivering an expected return (IRR) that 
exceeds a preset hurdle rate.  
 Despite the simple test, acquisitions are a common source of capital destruction What’s 
essential in this step is skepticism of optimistic scenarios, such as forecasts of value arising from 
synergies or other opportunities expected to materialize post-acquisition.  
  Improving an acquired company’s operations post-acquisition is a source of value 
creation. But managers do not always provide investors with sufficient information to evaluate 
proposed acquisitions completely or objectively. They provide projections that look compelling 
and business rationales that seem logical.  
 Yet acquisitions can be emotional, exciting managers and stoking optimism.  Managers 
cultivate QSs by playing down expectations from acquisitions, skipping talk of synergies and other 
often-elusive veins of value. An even better one: conducting ongoing post-acquisition analysis, 
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constantly updated, to compare expected IRR with actual ROIC and determining reasons for the 
difference.   
 Another source of discipline is using cash in preference to stock to pay for acquisitions. 
Using stock can inflate the price, often felt as play-money, more like poker chips than cash.  
 3.  Share Buybacks. At least one capital allocation decision can directly improve the 
quality of the shareholder base: share buybacks. When companies buy their own shares, the most 
likely cohort interested in meeting the demand are transients, who by definition are prepared to 
sell at all times. That automatically increases the proportion of shares held by longer term 
shareholders, such as QS. 
 But share buybacks are only rational for shareholders if the company pays a price less than 
a conservative estimate of the company’s per share intrinsic value. If so, that is prudent capital 
allocation; if not, it is capital squandering.  
 Buybacks were uncommon through the 1970s and 1980s, as dividends were the popular 
route for corporate distributions to shareholders.92 The pioneers stood out, including under Roberto 
Goizueta at Coca-Cola; Larry Tisch at Loews Corporation; Henry Singleton at Teledyne; and Kay 
Graham at The Washington Post Co. In that era, companies like those followed the textbook, 
repurchasing shares as a capital allocation exercise, when no better alternatives existed and price 
was below value.93 
 By the late 1990s, buybacks had become a common practice across corporate America. 
Such proliferation raised a new concern: whether managers possessing superior valuation 
information exploit selling shareholders when buying at a discount. To address this, managers 
must provide shareholders with all relevant valuation information. Otherwise, insiders take 
advantage of uninformed shareholders, confiscating their interests at pennies on the dollar—
anathema to QSs.   
 The advice Warren Buffett gives to investors applies equally to managers making capital 
allocation decisions: be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful. The 
most obvious application of this investment principle in the context of capital allocation concerns 
share buybacks. Companies make errors of both commission—buying too no matter how high the 
price—as well as omission—failing to buy when prices plummet.  
 Buybacks automatically increase earnings per share (EPS) and tend to boost stock prices. 
QSs are alert to these effects and oppose managers whose buybacks are motivated by such results 
rather than rational capital allocation. They are therefore skeptical of buyback formulas or quotas.  
Moreover, since buybacks automatically boost EPS, if that metric is an important part of 
managerial performance reviews or compensation, boards must be especially vigilant to deter 
share buybacks designed to boost executive pay.  
 Finally, when choosing between paying a cash dividend or buying back shares, the effects 
on shareholders and option holders differ greatly. Dividends increase returns to shareholders but 
 
 92 See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford W. Smith, Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends versus 
Open Market Share Repurchases, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 61-82 (1988) (while 81% of NYSE firms paid dividends 
from 1983 to 1986, less than 12% conducted share buybacks). 
 93 The legendary Teledyne executive, Henry Singleton (1916-1999), is an all-star for shareholder 
buybacks. See WILL THORNDIKE, THE OUTSIDERS.   
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decrease the value of options, while buybacks boost earnings per share and therefore increase 
option value. A conflict of interest looms between what is best for managers holding options and 
all other shareholders. That’s why QSs are skeptical of companies with significant executive stock 
option compensation coupled with significant share buybacks. In many such cases, a better capital 
allocation for shareholders would be dividends.  
 4. Dividends.  Dividends are another capital allocation decision that can directly shape the 
shareholder base. Regular dividends give shareholders a reason to stick around during troubled 
patches—they can be a useful magnet that lengthens holding periods and sometimes induces taking 
larger positions. This point was stressed by one of the more frenetic and diversified stock pickers, 
Peter Lynch, who gained fame as both a stock picker and author.94  
 A small group of companies boast paying an increasing dividend over the past five decades. 
A few examples, all of which are high on the list of attracting QSs: Coca-Cola, Dover, Genuine 
Parts, Hormel Foods, Johnson & Johnson, and Procter & Gamble. Even sustaining regular dividend 
increases for one decade is difficult, with fewer than 300 companies having managed to do so of 
late. 
 At the other end of the spectrum are companies that have not paid dividends, either ever or 
in recent memory. The reasons are mixed, running the gamut from dazzling growth opportunities 
to trouble meeting bills. Whatever the direction taken, it is best for CEOs always to explain capital 
allocation policy and choices in their annual shareholder letters.       
 5. Board Oversight. Corporate law requires that boards approve major acquisitions and 
dividends, and as a practical matter to approve share buyback programs.95 Along with such 
approvals, good practice dictates that the board’s principal role is setting applicable hurdle rates, 
for reinvestment and acquisitions.  
 Companies wishing to make capital allocation a priority could revisit whether to create a 
board committee with this oversight. At S&P 500 companies, boards maintain an average of four 
committees, and about 1/3 include a committee on capital allocation, finance or investment.96 
Charters might call for post-investment reviews on all important allocations, especially organic 
growth initiatives, acquisitions, and share buybacks.  
 If one advantage of cultivating QS is developing relationships and potential directors, 
capital allocation is an area where they can add particularly rich value. So long as a board boasts 
some such expertise, and the rest of the board learns from them, there’s no need for a capital 
allocation committee.  
B. Separation Transactions  
  Conventional wisdom says that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” But often 
the opposite is true, and the parts are more valuable on their own. For companies, a simple way to 
capture that greater value would be to sell the higher-valued parts. While commonplace, doing so 
poses adverse tax consequences that destroy rather than enhance shareholder value. Many better 
 
 94  PETER LYNCH, ONE UP ON WALL STREET (1989). 
 95 E.g., Del. C. §§ 154 (dividends), 160 (repurchases technically do not explicitly require board 
approval but statutory rules violations expose directors to personal liability); 251 (mergers). 
 96 See Phil Ordway Research. 
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alternative approaches have been devised to solve this problem, to channel value to shareholders, 
while offering the added advantage of segmenting the shareholder base and attracting QS.  
 Collectively called “separation” transactions, these are well-known, if exotic, structures 
such as tracking stocks, public offerings of minority interests in subsidiaries, and spin-offs. 
Separation transactions produce potential benefits for both the parent as well as the newly-
separated business. The parent may gain from a sharper focus on its core retained businesses—
along with improved pricing rationality of its stock—and the separated business may gain from its 
new status as an autonomous entity freshly nurtured by that parent.   
 From the viewpoint of shaping the shareholder base, these transactions offer additional 
benefits: tracking stocks can create internal business delineations to separate QSs from transients, 
with QSs tied to a core business and transients to the non-core business. Spin offs of non-core 
businesses can be designed to appease, deter or thwart activists. Both of these and similar other 
transactions sometimes trigger screens that result in companies being excluded from major indexes 
such as the S&P 500—a benefit to any companies wishing to reduce the density of indexers in 
their shareholder base.     
  1. Trackers.97  The simplest and most obvious way to segment the shareholder base is to 
create multiple tracking stocks for a single company. The technique is designed to match different 
shareholder bases to different businesses, without legally separating them. For example, a business 
requiring long-term R&D investment with long product cycles should attract longer-term 
shareholders while one selling quotidian commodities at spot prices might attract shorter-term 
shareholders. 
 Tracking stocks, corporate equity of a parent tied to the economic performance of a 
subsidiary, were the 1984 brainchild of Georgetown University tax professor Martin D. Ginsburg, 
late husband of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Prof. Ginsburg’s design, still used to this day, solved 
a problem for H. Ross Perot, the colorful Texas billionaire.  
 In 1984, when General Motors Co. acquired Mr. Perot’s company, Electronic Data 
Systems, he and his many employee-shareholders were concerned that EDS’s performance would 
be lost within the GM behemoth. They wanted to ensure that superior performance of EDS would 
be rewarded regardless of how the rest of GM performed, including due to the relative time 
horizons of each company. The solution: the EDS group accepted shares in GM, but performance 
was tied to the economics and related time horizons of EDS, aptly dubbed “Class E stock.” 
 Prof. Ginsburg’s invention was so effective that GM copied it the next year when acquiring 
Hughes Aircraft Company—using currency dubbed GM “Class H stock.” Both trackers remained 
in place for more than a decade until GM spun the companies off, distributing all GM’s stock in 
them to GM shareholders to form freestanding companies. GM’s tracking stock worked well for 
all concerned, especially Mr. Perot, who showed his gratitude by endowing a professorship at 
Georgetown: The Martin D. Ginsburg Chair in Taxation.    
 The Ginsburg Model.  When corporations issue stock, stockholders enjoy many rights 
against that issuer; boards control the whole and owe associated duties to all stockholders; and 
governments levy associated taxes. Trackers splice rights to different shareholder groups, without 
 
97 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Patrick T. Brennan, Tracking Stocks: Rise, Fall, Revival, FIN. 
HIS. (Fall 2017).  
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relinquishing board prerogatives or repudiating duties, while simultaneously deferring tax 
consequences.  
 The terms of tracking stock put parental control in its board, provide mechanisms to track 
the economic performance of the targeted business, and set policies for dealings between parental 
units to be at arm’s-length. Boards often adopt dividend policies based on cash flows of targeted 
businesses, retain power to convert tracking stock into the parent’s common (an “unwind” feature), 
and pledge to redeem the stock upon the sale of the tracked business’s assets. Otherwise, tracking 
stock terms are the same as the parent’s ordinary common, on matters such as voting rights and 
rights upon parent liquidation, although some variation is possible.  
 Exact advantages of tracking stock structures vary depending on the specific features of 
the various businesses and how they interact. Benefits may include offsetting tax benefits when 
one business generates substantial taxable profits while another incurs substantial losses; combined 
balance sheet strength equating to lower borrowing costs; immunization from antitrust laws that 
might prohibit two independent businesses from coordination that is perfectly legal among 
business units of the same family; and adding incentives for managers to enhance the performance 
of businesses they run by compensating them in their own tracking stock.   
 Rise.  The original tracker model, tailor-made for GM’s acquisitions, was soon adapted to 
other settings. In 1991-92, U.S. Steel Corporation enjoyed synergies through common control of 
such diverse subsidiaries as Delhi Group and Marathon Oil, which shared gas-processing plants 
and enjoyed lower borrowing costs together than if independent. But the businesses had distinct 
economics so that a tracking stock would both keep the advantages of common control while 
increasing visibility into the tracked business with gains for stockholders and managers alike. The 
solution worked for a decade until USX spun Marathon Oil off.  
 In 1995, after the government’s antitrust break-up of AT&T, US West was a regional 
telephone company which also owned cable and cellular assets. Long-term investors attracted to 
the stability of the telephone utility might recoil at the volatility of media assets; shorter-term 
investors seeking rapid growth would have opposite tastes. Trackers satisfied the demand of each 
while housing all operations under common control, harvesting related synergies. To further meet 
investor tastes, the utility side would pay regular dividends as the media side would reinvest 
earnings. And the arrangement could be unwound as circumstances changed: in fact, in 1998, after 
synergies proved elusive, US West spun off the media business.  
 In the mid-1990s, the iconic investor and telecom mogul, John Malone, used trackers to 
segment the economics of diverse media assets he had been acquiring for decades through 
TeleCommunications Inc. (TCI). In addition to other advantages ranging from antitrust to tax, 
Malone realized that cable assets along with programming, for example, were better combined 
than separate from an operations perspective. Yet they featured different economic attributes. 
Using tracking stocks for such businesses could translate into higher price-earnings multiples, 
which can be valuable when using stock to acquire other companies.  
 The TCI transactions were distinct in both complexity and boldness, which drew critics. 
They referenced conflicts of interest between siblings that all parent boards using trackers face. 
TCI’s prospectus said as much, then simply avowed confidence in its directors’ ability to discharge 
their duties. This amounted to an “implicit message of ‘trust us’,” critics said, urging such boards 
to establish structural cures, such as independent committees. But no governance devices can 
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resolve such problems, and one truth about trackers is that, to make them beneficial for all parties, 
the parent’s board must be trustworthy.  
 Stumble and Fall.  As QS Bill Ruane once lamented: on Wall Street, the process goes from 
innovation to imitation to irrationality. The same held for trackers, as they proliferated in the late 
1990s technology sector amid irrational exuberance fueling the bubble. A common theme featured 
a traditional company offering trackers in an internet subsidiary: bookseller Barnes & Noble for 
its e-tailing operations; The Walt Disney Company with Go.com; brokerage firm Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette for its online trading businesses, DLJdirect; and publisher Ziff-Davis for its 
online operations, ZD.net. 
 Nearing a peak, in mid-2000 about 30 listed trackers traded—half issued during the 
bubble—and several then pending were soon aborted, including for DuPont Co.'s life sciences 
business, The New York Times online, and Staples.com. Others soon wound down, including at 
Disney and DLJ (then owned by CSFB). While the market for tech recovered, appetite for trackers 
remained dim. Although a few trackers launched in 2001 and 2002, none debuted during 2003 or 
2004.  
  Skeptics included luminaires from the value investing world such as Columbia Business 
School professor Bruce Greenwald and Wall Street Journal veteran Roger Lowenstein. They 
challenged many companies’ trackers as “putting lipstick on a pig” or “rearranging deck chairs on 
the Titanic.” Proponents of efficient market theory could not imagine how ownership structures 
could affect the market’s valuation of businesses.    
 During the bubble, many companies used trackers less to solve a knotty business 
problem—which could as easily be resolved by separate audited financials—than to follow frothy 
markets. Many issuers lacked the compelling rationale that makes trackers suitable—operational 
synergies, interdependence, tax efficiency, or acquisition opportunities. It was not enough to repeat 
versions of the US West story—which had in any event faltered.  
 But despite the broad retreat from trackers, Malone saw them as an ideal solution for 
numerous challenges he faced managing Liberty Media. By 2005, Liberty was a complex group 
of diverse media assets needing simplification.  Malone began by spinning off two businesses—a 
collection of international media assets and a 50% stake in Discovery Communications. Still, 
Liberty Media perceived continued stock market undervaluation—by as much as 70 percent.  
 To address these challenges, Liberty Media created trackers, Liberty Interactive (LINTA) 
and Liberty Capital (LCAPA). LINTA was anchored by Liberty’s 98% interest in QVC, the 
television shopping channel and strong cash generator, and included the company’s 22% interest 
in Expedia, the online travel agency, and 22% stake in IAC, owner of such companies as Ask 
Jeeves and Ticketmaster.  
 LCAPA would house all other assets, including, as the prospectus explained, “video 
programming and communications technology and services involving cable, satellite, the Internet 
and other distribution media as they evolve”—in other words, anything telecom related. These 
assets included a variety of businesses and securities, such as the wholly-owned Starz and On 
Command; the partly owned FUN; and public equity in Motorola, News Corp., Sprint, and Time 
Warner—the latter accompanied by a variety of complex hedging instruments.   
 Liberty thus created two sets of assets of appeal to different types of investors. Those who 
favored predictable cashflows from QVC and other straightforward stalwarts would be more 
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attracted to LINTA; those wanting to bet on Malone’s record of buying and selling a variety of 
diverse media assets and financial hedging transactions could gravitate towards LCAPA.   
 When trackers increase a company’s aggregate valuation, that strengthens a company’s 
hand in acquisitions it pays for using stock.  For Liberty Media, this proved valuable by 2008 in 
the depths of the financial crisis, when LCAPA acquired satellite radio operator SiriusXM. With 
a total return exceeding 38 times its initial investment (to date), this is among the most successful 
investments of the century, outdoing even those famously executed during the crisis by Warren 
Buffett.    
 Critics would say that if parent stock is undervalued, a board can intensify buyback 
programs until corrected, and if a company is too complex, it should be simplified. On the other 
hand, Liberty had tried both buybacks and spin-offs but undervaluation persisted. Costs of the 
tracking structure include internal managerial resources to design and implement it, along with 
external costs of educating analysts and investors on the rationales. But these costs are not great 
and, if the program fails, it can readily be unwound, also at modest incremental cost.    
 The issue came down to a venerable debate, whether trackers are mere financial 
engineering—in the purely negative sense of doing nothing to increase underlying fundamental 
value—or a financial achievement that increases value by deftly combining assets to cater to 
differing investor appetites while maintaining economic efficiency. Given the dot.com experience, 
the verdict for almost all companies was in, but for Malone and Liberty Media, the jury was out.  
 After all, the same critical logic would denounce spinoffs yet history proves their value—
and, for that matter, the dot.com era aside, history had proven the value of trackers, as the 
McKinsey study showed. Today, history appears to be on the side of trackers: in 2008, the Wall 
Street Journal declared them “relics” on the “verge of extinction.” In 2016, tax lawyers from Fried 
Frank—where Prof. Ginsburg once worked—proclaimed, with apologies to Mark Twain, that 
reports of the death of trackers are “greatly exaggerated.” A new wave of trackers had emerged, 
offering compelling rationales.  
 Revival. In 2013, Fantex, whose business consists of separate branding contracts with 
professional athletes, offered trackers tied to the economic value of those contracts; in 2014, 
Fidelity National Financial Inc., a title insurance company with an investment strategy focused on 
individual businesses, offered trackers tied to its core business as well as those investees; in 2016, 
Dell used tracking stock as part of its purchase of EMC Corp., tracking EMC’s 80%-owned 
subsidiary, VMWare, Inc., a publicly-traded software company.  
 Researchers at Merrill Lynch in 2016 published a paper identifying all the familiar benefits 
as well as costs and stressed that trackers are only advisable when a company can offer a 
compelling rationale. It devoted a full page depicting nearly a dozen Liberty Media trackers, and 
said: “The tracking stocks and spin-offs issued by Liberty from 2004-2015 have resulted in an out-
performance vs. the S&P 500 Index of >200% for the Liberty investor.” 
 Aside from segmenting the shareholder base between transients and QSs, trackers may also 
dramatically reduce the indexing cohort. This is because many index providers, such as the S&P 
500, exclude companies with tracking stocks from their index—as some likewise do to companies 
with dual class capital structures. The same result follows for companies with subsidiaries that are 
publicly traded.  
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 2. Public Subsidiaries. While indexing offers some advantages to companies and 
shareholders alike, too much indexing can be a negative. For managers and directors concerned 
about excessive concentration of indexers in their stock, a few observations are warranted. For 
one, despite the pervasiveness and scale of indexers, many wonderful publicly-traded companies, 
large and small, avoid inclusion on indexes altogether and even more are outside the index-heavy 
populations such as the S&P 500.  This is because the index managers apply various filters in 
assembling indexes.  
 While index managers such as the S&P may appear to sweep up all companies possessing 
specific criteria of size or sector, most apply additional screening rules. Companies in the screens 
are excluded from certain indexes, reducing the proportion of their shareholder base drawn from 
the indexing cohort. 
 Some screens offer most companies no flexibility to reduce index exposure. For instance, 
U.S. index managers usually exclude non-U.S. issuers and few companies would opt for an 
overseas incorporation solely to reduce the percentage of indexers in the shareholder base. In fact, 
the opposite may be more common—non-U.S, companies, such as Alibaba, say, reincorporating 
in the U.S. to expand the index cohort. 
 Another screen excludes companies with a majority shareholder.98 One way a company 
could take advantage of this screen is through subsidiary IPOs—the company lists a minority 
interests in a subsidiary. As the parent, the company parent enjoys ownership along with fellow 
shareholders who are not indexers. That translates into a more rational stock price and a more 
engaged shareholder base focused on business performance. Additional advantages include the 
following:99  
  • Market Valuation—By giving third-party investors a basis to value subsidiaries directly 
in public equity markets, the listing offers parent shareholders an objective measure of the value 
of its publicly traded subsidiaries.  
 • Transparency—As public companies and SEC registrants, these subsidiaries provide 
financial disclosures that enhances transparency for parent shareholders.  
 • Self-financing—The subsidiaries can, with greater ease, directly access capital markets 
to finance operations and expansion, if needed.  
 • Recruiting top talent—The opportunity to hold a senior executive position in a publicly-
traded company is appealing to most candidates. 
 Subsidiary IPOs also pose downsides, of course. Disagreements or conflicts can arise 
between the boards and managers of the parent and sub. Such downsides were delineated by Sony 
in 2013 when it rejected activist pressure to publicly offer minority shares in its entertainment unit.  
Sony pointed to parental reversals of subsidiary IPOs after several years at News Corporation (of 
Fox Entertainment) and Time Warner (of American Television and Cable).   
 
 98  E.g., S&P U.S. Indices Methodology (July 2019) (excluding tracking stocks, multiple class share 
structures). 
 99 See Loews Corporation Annual Report (2016) (stating these as advantages to this company’s 
structure with several listed controlled subsidiaries).  
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 In some cases, trackers would be better for shareholders, for the advantages described 
earlier. Both alternatives warrant consideration, as does yet another: spin-offs, a device also of 
great value in deterring activists. 
 3. Spins.  In recent years, amid calls for focusing rather than diversifying, managers find it 
increasingly difficult to justify conglomerates.  A few companies have justified sprawling diversity 
on organizational grounds—Berkshire is a prominent example, but widely seen as one-of-a-kind, 
too exceptional to use as a model for public companies, at least outside the insurance industry. For 
most, attempts at justification fall flat and invite activists who push for prompt divestitures. To 
avoid that fate, and win over QSs, a regular program of growth and trimming may make more 
sense. 
 Activists have long favored spin-offs, the most common form of separation transaction. A 
parent corporation declares a tax-free dividend, to all its shareholders, of stock in a subsidiary 
business to be separated. Upon payment of the dividend, the spun business becomes a freestanding 
independent entity. 
 Spin-offs were a familiar type of corporate transaction in the 1990s, with some 325 closed 
that decade.100 Thereafter, interest slowed to a fraction of that through 2015, but from there interest 
renewed and they have become more frequent. Prominent spins—all instigated by activist 
investors—include eBay spinning PayPal (at the urging of Carl Icahn); EMC spinning VMware 
(Elliott Management); and Timken spinning its steel business (Relational Investors).  
 Across decades, spins have had multiple uses. They have been used to separate businesses 
lacking a continuing strategic fit, such as when AT&T spun off Lucent and NCR in 1996. They 
have been used to break up conglomerates, such as when ITT split into three in 1995. In 1998, 
Alleghany Corporation, under the leadership of renowned investor-manager John Burns, spun-off 
its Chicago Title Corporation business, creating a major new independent insurance company with 
an initial market capitalization exceeding $1 billion. 
 Some managers have used spins to clean up a business plagued by problems, as occurred 
with numerous spins out of Tyco International in the years following its financial scandals. A wave 
of spinoffs involved separating an operating company’s real estate interests—often into tax-
advantaged real estate investment trusts—at such companies as Macy’s and MGM Resorts. 
 Others have used spins as part of a recurring process that involves both regular business 
expansion—whether acquired or organic—and later divestitures of some of them. An example is 
Sears Holdings, which from 1993 to 2014 spun off such powerhouses it had nurtured as Allstate, 
Dean Witter, Diehard, Discover, and Land’s End.  
 The results can be mixed, however. A notable serial spinner is IDT Corporation, founded 
and long run by Howard Jonas, succeeded in 2014 by his son. The company and its founder are 
highly regarded and have achieved substantial shareholders returns, though unevenly. Effecting 
spins has been a part of the standard practice—some have performed exceptionally well, others 
the opposite.  
 To illustrate, Straight Path Communications, a 2013 spin that began trading around $5 per 
share rose by 2019 to $180, but Zedge, a 2016 spin that began trading at just above $7 was in 2019 
 
 100 See STEPHEN I. GLOVER, BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS: SPIN-OFFS, SUBSIDIARY 
IPOS AND TRACKING STOCK (2018). 
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trading below $2.  In between, the stock of IDW Media, a 2009 spin, began around $2 and rose to 
as high as around $40, before retreating in 2019 to $17.  Spins are not for the faint of heart; but 
QSs will be attracted to learn more from managers willing to engage with the idea.  
 John Malone is also an avid proponent of spin-offs, matching his enthusiasm for tracking 
stocks. Liberty Media is constantly making acquisitions, but also constantly divesting, whether 
directly in selling interests or, more often, in slicing them through spin offs (or trackers). Prominent 
spin-offs include: Liberty Global/Discovery, DirecTV, Liberty Global, Starz, and QVC.  
The spin-off pushes interests back and outside the entity, negating conglomerate; rather 
than creating an empire under consolidated rule, it is as if the king hives off earldoms, dukedoms, 
and other fiefdoms and locates them where their value will be best appreciated.   
 Underlying the trackers and spins, as well as the rest of Malone’s approach are optimizing 
leverage, efficient taxation, opportunistic deal making. In addition, such structures lead to internal 
growth of talented managers and better incentive programs. The output from these efforts are 
extraordinary shareholder returns, a compound annual growth rate since 2006 of roughly 18% 
Such results attract QS. 
 Spins have become increasingly common in recent years as a way to increase focus and 
related capital allocation, whether at conglomerates or otherwise. As such, a strategy that includes 
spin-offs as a regular element can be a strong general deterrent to activists, as well as a source of 
shareholder value.    
C. Trading Activity 
 Professor Rock notes that listing on major exchanges signals credibility.101  Listing 
decisions could well be important to nascent corporations or a factor in some, especially foreign 
corporations, seeking a dual listing.102  Some companies cross-list to attract investors in specific 
additional locales. While cross listing may add shareholders in a new geography, this may include 
every type of shareholder. Managers do well to signal their particular appeal to QSs.     
 The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq (once known as NASDAQ) are arch 
rivals engaged an intense competitive battle for listings, so corporate managers would certainly 
have an opportunity to consider which listing, if either, delivers a more sought-after shareholder 
base. For purposes of this Article, it is worth considering whether one or the other is more or less 
appealing to QS. As the following discussion will conclude, it does not, although the recently-
formed Long Term Stock Exchange promises to disrupt the prevailing model. 
 
 101 Rock, supra note 3, at 878. 
 102 An instructive case concerns Fairfax Financial. The company, long listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE), in late 2002 added a NYSE listing. Fairfax had publicly discussed the listing for several 
years before completing it. The rationale was to attract U.S. investors and assist U.S. employees in owning 
the stock.  But it also attracted substantial short-sellers which, Fairfax believes, manufactured negative 
press. The company sued, alleging illegal market manipulation. Some defendants settled the lawsuit, while 
others defended it vigorously. Parts of the case were dismissed for technical legal reasons, but the 
substantive claims remain alive, as the case continues 15 years after it begun. In any event, Fairfax’s need 
for the dual listing proved short lived. By 2009, it had become so easy for U.S. investors to use the TSE 
that Fairfax, by then a well-known global firm, delisted from the NYSE, saving associated administrative 
costs. 
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 The different stock exchanges have established branded reputations for certain kinds of 
companies, with at least some small effect on attracting different investors. The NYSE, for 
example, has the blue-chip reputation, a ring of the establishment and permanence. On the other 
hand, the Nasdaq built its brand as home to vanguard tech companies.103 
 Stock exchanges facilitate trading between buyers and sellers through firms which 
intermediate the demand and supply sides for pay. The compensation—which covers their own 
services and costs of system administration—is the bid-ask spread, the difference between the 
price intermediaries charge buyers for a stock and the price intermediaries pay sellers for it.  
 There is always a spread, but size varies with supply and demand and drivers such as 
volume and liquidity. For instance, the spread in trading currencies is almost always tiny, as those 
are the deepest and most liquid type of markets in the world. For stock markets, on the NYSE, the 
average spread (expressed as a percentage of the bid) is about ½ of one percent (50 basis points) 
while on the Nasdaq spreads average about 2.5% (250 basis points).104   
 Lower bid-ask spreads have inspired some companies to move from the Nasdaq to the 
NYSE, including Berkshire and Markel.  But that was in the period through the early 2000s, when 
the general pattern saw companies first list on Nasdaq and later migrate to the NYSE;105 since 
2005, a more common pattern has involved NYSE-listed companies moving to Nasdaq. Oracle’s 
2013 move from Nasdaq to NYSE was among the last of the traditional moves; Pepsi’s 2017 was 
among the largest relisting in the new direction. Charles Schwab made a round-trip: switching 
from NYSE to Nasdaq in 2005 and later back.  
 The NYSE used to brag about its dominant position, declaring in its 2007 annual report:   
 From 2001 to 2006, 121 companies transferred their listing from Nasdaq to 
the NYSE. During that same period, only five companies voluntarily transferred 
from the NYSE to Nasdaq.106 
 But that was when NYSE listing rules made it difficult for companies to leave. Departure 
required board and audit committee votes, notices to all shareholders, and outreach to the largest 
shareholders. After the NYSE repealed those requirements under pressure, Nasdaq has been on a 
competitive tear.  
 Nasdaq’s 2007 annual report boasted of poaching 32 companies from the NYSE and 30 
from the (soon-defunct) American Stock Exchange. Every Nasdaq annual report since describes 
 
 103 The name change was effected in 2017.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, Release No. 
34-81917; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2017-111 (October 23, 2017),  
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2017/34-81917.pdf.  
 
104 On its website, the NYSE boasts of its narrow spread—on average 46 basis points compared to 
all other exchanges, with NASDAQ at 253 basis points.  See also Christine X. Jiang, Jang-Chul Kim & 
Robert A. Wood, A Comparison of Volatility and Bid–ask Spread for NASDAQ and NYSE After 
Decimalization, Journal of Applied Economics (2011) (“Transaction costs measured by quoted and effective 
spreads remain significantly higher on NASDAQ than on NYSE. . . .”) 
 105 See Simi Kedia & Venkatesh Panchapagesan, Why Do Only Some Nasdaq Firms Switch to the 
NYSE? Evidence from Corporate Transactions, J. FIN MARKETS, 14, 109-126 (2011). 
 
 106  NYSE Annual Report on 10-K, 2007 WL 8639287. 
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the competition for market share between Nasdaq and NYSE and tallies companies relisting from 
the NYSE. As of 2018, Nasdaq said it had poached a total of some 300 listings, boasting a total 
market capitalization of $1.5 trillion.   
 Table 2 tabulates switches from NYSE to Nasdaq for the past decade. It includes quite a 
few companies scoring high in QS density, including Automatic Data Processing, CME Group, 
News Corp., PepsiCo, Workday, and Xcel Energy. However, overall, the distribution of these 
companies does not support concluding that the switch is associated with higher QS densities.107  
 
Table 2 Relisting from NYSE to Nasdaq 
Year No. $B Cap Examples  
2008 9 130 News Corp., Automatic Data Processing, CME Group, Jack in the 
Box, Celera, Mylan, Seagate Technology 
2009 10 154 BMC Software, Cypress Semiconductor, Dreamworks Animation, 
Mattel, Micron Technology, Network Equipment Technologies, R.R. 
Donnelley & Sons, TriMas Corp., Vodafone Group, Windstream 
Corp. 
2010 3 10 Hasbro, Avis Budget Group, Potlatch Corp. 
2011 7 42 Fifth Street Finance Corp., Frontier Communications Corp., Icahn 
Enterprises, Magnetek, SLM Corp., Viacom Inc., Wendy’s  
2012 16 135 Kraft Foods, Texas Instruments, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Analog 
Devices 
2013 31 47 VimpelCom, Marriott International, Amdocs Limited 
2014 17 5 Office Depot 
2015 27 84 T‐Mobile US, CSX Corp., Pinnacle Entertainment, TD Ameritrade 
Holding Corp. 
2016 20 61 IHS Markit, Imperva, OPKO Health, Scripps Networks Interactive, 
tronc, Trupanion, Willis Towers Watson 
2017 11 218 PepsiCo, Principal Financial Group, Workday 
2018 18 111 Xcel Energy, United Continental Holdings, Regency Centers Corp., 
Avent, Newell Brands, Weight Watchers International 
Source: Table compiled from annual reports on 10K of Nasdaq Inc. 
 There may be good reasons for a company to switch between the Nasdaq and the NYSE. 
But the frequency and stated rationales for such shifting suggest the causes are due more to the 
competition between those rivals stirring up the moves than obvious shareholder benefits.   
 
 107  This is based on comparing the companies listed in Table 2 with LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, 
QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW MANAGERS ATTRACT THE BEST SHAREHOLDERS (2020), App. A. 
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 Companies cite cheaper listing fees for corporations. These may diverge significantly. 
They run as low as $155,000 on Nasdaq compared with up to $500,000 for the NYSE.  But while 
that may be attractive to the company, it ignores the relative trading costs shareholders incur, 
including due to Nasdaq’s higher bid-ask spreads.  
 Two other arguments favoring Nasdaq over the NYSE contradict the goal of attracting 
more QSs relative to transients and indexers. First, the empirical evidence indicates that the switch 
tends to increase trading costs and attract transients.108 
 Second, one consequence of a Nasdaq listing is potential inclusion in its famous indexes, 
such as the QQQ or the Nasdaq 100.109 While some may see that as appealing, it is a disadvantage 
to any company wishing to attract a relatively greater density of QSs compared to indexers.  
 Inclusion in an index automatically means being purchased—or sold—by a large number 
of investors whose decisions are not based on the company’s performance or prospects but merely 
its inclusion. The automatic trading by indexers adds liquidity, supra note xxx, attracting more 
transients. Worse, index membership tends to drive price up, sometimes above value, because 
purchases and sales are made based not on value but on price.   
 Exchanges rarely compete for branding around long-term companies and associated 
shareholders—after all, their lifeblood is trading. Yet an upstart, called the Long-Term Stock 
Exchange (LTSE), is poised to shake that up. Proposed listing standards aim to attract QSs.  
 In terms of the corporate menu, LTSE-listed companies would be expected to publicize 
their long-term strategy, update it annually, and provide relevant metrics to judge its success. In 
addition, companies would be prohibited from offering quarterly guidance. Among topics 
discussed elsewhere in this Article, LTSE supports time-weighted voting and disclosure of how 
share buybacks affect earnings per share.  To quote LTSE’s pitch: 
 By aiming to reduce companies’ sensitivity to quarterly pressure and 
introduce greater accountability for the behaviors that create long-term value, the 
LTSE is working to forge a new relationship between long-term focused companies 
and their investors. 
 To date, shareholders have not generally expressed great preference over a company’s 
exchange listing. LTSE’s arrival promises to change that.     
D. Director Selection 
  Today’s shareholder cohorts take different approaches to the director selection process. 
Through the 1970s, corporate directors were chosen by chief executives, who valued shared 
outlooks and offered unwavering support. From the 1980s through the early 2000s, institutional 
shareholders gained a greater voice in the selection process as they applied pressure to appoint 
directors with greater independence. Today, that voice is as fragmented as the shareholder base it 
is supposed to serve.   
 
 108 See Viet Anh et al., The curious case of changes in trading dynamics: When firms switch from 
NYSE to NASDAQ, J. FIN. MARKETS vol. 41, pp. 17-35 (2018).  
 109 Rock, supra note 3, at 882. 
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 While it is difficult to determine, empirically, which methods or structures are superior, it 
is illuminating to highlight some of the important differences among the approach to director 
selection by today’s dominant shareholder cohorts.    
 1. Stewards. QSs seek directors with a shareholder orientation, business savvy, and interest 
in the particular company and its stewardship. They are more interested in those particular director 
traits, and the specific context of a given company, than following general formulas or perceived 
best practices.110    
 The number-one question QSs want to know about any director candidates, however, is 
whether they are shareholder oriented. That is, all directors should act as if there is a single 
absentee owner and do everything reasonably possible to advance that owner’s long-term interest.  
 This is not a mandate for the immediate maximization of shareholder value, but rather a 
mentality to evaluate every decision from the shareholder perspective. To that end, it is desirable 
for directors to buy and hold sizable personal stakes in companies they serve, so that they truly 
walk in the shoes of owners. 
 The board’s most important job is selecting an outstanding CEO. If the board secures an 
outstanding CEO, it will likely face few other major problems. All CEOs must be measured 
according to a set of performance standards. A board’s outside directors must formulate these 
standards and regularly evaluate the CEO in light of them—without the CEO being present.   
 Standards should be tailored to the particular business culture but should stress 
fundamental baselines, such as returns on shareholder capital and progress in market value per 
share over multiple years. Above all, directors should evaluate the CEOs record on capital 
allocation measured against a hurdle rate it sets.   
 Directors need to think independently to tighten the wiggle room that “long-term” gives to 
CEOs: although corporate leaders should think in terms of years, not quarters, they must not 
rationalize sustained subpar performance by perpetual pleas to shareholder patience. After all, 
long-term can be excessive, passing into a euphemism for endless mediocrity. The solution: 
directors who insist on achieving measurable intermediate goals as well. 
 If the CEO’s performance persistently falls short of the standards set by the directors, then 
the board must replace the CEO. The same goes for all other senior managers boards oversee, just 
as an intelligent owner would if present. In addition, the directors must be the stewards of owner 
capital to contain any managerial overreach that dips into shareholders’ pockets. Such 
pickpocketing can range from imperious acquisition sprees to managerial enrichment through 
interested transactions or even myopia amid internal scandal and related crisis. 
 In addressing these problems, the director’s actions must be fair, swift, and decisive. 
Directors who perceive a managerial problem should immediately alert other directors to the issue. 
If enough are persuaded, concerted action can be readily coordinated to resolve the problem. 
 Here, too, shareholders can play a role. As discussed in chapter 7, companies can make 
their directors available to their largest long-term QSs. These representatives can discuss issues 
put to shareholder votes that affect enduring value. A few influential QSs, acting together, can 
 
 110 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s Ten Commandments for Directors, NACD 
DIRECTORSHIP (July-August 2017). 
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effectively reform a given company’s corporate governance simply by withholding their votes for 
directors who were tolerating odious behavior.  
 2. Formulaic Selection.  Indexers seldom nominate directors. In fact, during the past five 
years, none of the largest three indexers—which own enormous swaths of corporations 
worldwide—have formally nominated a single director to any public company board.111 
 Large indexers adopt their own guidelines stating general criteria for selection and voting 
while others consult the similar guidelines produced by proxy advisers. Index proponents 
repeatedly express their view that popular governance reform features are good for most 
companies across a portfolio, not necessarily for all.112  
 Consider the approach of the leading proxy adviser, Institutional Shareholder Service 
(ISS).  ISS opens its discussion of the board of directors not with statements of competence or 
corporate stewardship, but with “four fundamental principles [that] apply when determining votes 
on director nominees.”  
 These are enumerated as independence, composition, responsiveness and accountability.  
Only the assessment of “responsiveness,” tends to be contextual—a statement of voting “case-by-
base.”    
 On independence, ISS makes three prescriptions: (1) a majority of directors must be 
independent; (2) the board must have three standing committees operating under formal charters 
and staffed only with independent directors—audit, compensation, and nominating; and (3) there 
must either be a lead independent director or an independent chairman (not also serving as an 
executive officer).  
 Many such rules have become commonly accepted in recent decades, but the empirical 
evidence on their economic value remains inconclusive.113 While the prescribed committees and 
their functions are required by federal law or stock exchange rules, director expertise is often of 
even greater value than independence. Unmentioned by the indexers are valuable alternatives such 
as committees on capital allocation or investment—as described above. 
 While indexers support a rule splitting the chair and CEO roles, it is not always desirable. 
The theory is that boards elect and oversee the CEO so having one person wear both hats creates 
a conflict. Yet that is only one vote among boards with many independent directors, so any conflict 
can easily be neutralized. 
 Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both chairman and 
chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split. Companies are about evenly 
divided on the practice: about half the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine 
 
 111 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note  ____.  
 112  Fisch et al., supra note ___.  
 113   E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002); Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, FED. 
RES. BANK NY ECON. POL’Y REV. 7 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: 
Legal Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CINN. L. REV. 465 (2008); Usha Rodrigues, The 
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008). 
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them. QSs appear to think about this case-by-case and, if anything, slightly favor companies that 
combine rather than split the functions.114 
 On composition, ISS again states three rules: (1) directors should have diverse skills that 
add value to the board, rather than duplicating backgrounds from particular viewpoints, ideally 
presented in a graphical skills matrix to illustrate; (2) regular meeting attendance is expected, 
defined as at least 75% of meetings of the full board and committees; and (3) attention is expected, 
determined by caps on the number of public company boards individual directors may serve—five 
in general or two for CEOs.  
 Critics challenge these composition directives as intrusive and formulaic. Taking (2) and 
(3) first, attendance and attention are clearly necessary, but not sufficient, to determine a valuable 
board member.  Rules of thumb are useful, but that’s not how these rules operate. That is why the 
board of directors’ section of so many corporate websites portray check marks ticking off all the 
governance formulas that major indexers and proxy advisors champion.  
 While it is prudent to be concerned about anyone stretching themselves too thin, an 
artificial definition, such as a maximum of two or five boards, is arbitrary and bound to miss the 
mark often.  After all, outstanding directors with no other occupation can almost certainly handle 
more than six, while the least conscientious busy professional might find one too much.    
 On accountability, ISS calls for regular director elections, opposes staggered terms, and 
believes in shareholder removal power, with or without cause. But state corporate law permits all 
these and many other approaches to director election and removal, and leaves it to companies to 
choose those best suited for their circumstances.  
 On staggered boards, proponents stress advantages such as continuity and institutional 
knowledge while critics cite insulation from accountability. But answers to such issues require 
context. Some evidence indicates that staggered boards add value.115 Companies continue to be 
divided on the right approach.116 What’s clear is that ISS favors regimentation over context on this 
issue and many others where QS prefer a contextual approach.117  
 
 114 The assertions in this paragraph are based on comparing data on companies with and without 
split chair-CEO functions to CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, at App. A (QS 
Density Ranking). For instance, within the S&P 500, 229 split and 245 combine the roles; of these, 216 and 
234, respectively, appear in the QSDR.  Of those splitting, 16% are in the top 10%, 40% in the top quarter, 
and 89% in the top half; of those combining, 28% are in the top 10%, 57% in the top quarter, and 84% in 
the top half. 
 115 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016). 
 116 See Bebchuk & Hirst Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..  (indicating 
that about half the Russell 3000 companies have staggered boards).  According to Wharton Research Data 
Services WRDS, within the S&P 500, 61 companies have staggered boards. Comparing these 61 and a 
random sample of 61 with unitary boards to CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 2, at 
App. A (QS Density Ranking), 14% of the staggered board companies are in the top 10% of quality 
shareholder density versus 37% of the unitary board company sample in the top 10%.  
 117 A final prong of ISS’s accountability plank prescribes that each board undertake regular 
performance reviews of itself. This is another fashion in corporate governance that is reinforced by 
consulting firms offering the service CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD’S NEWEST PROFESSION: 
42 
 
 Just as major indexers do not nominate directors, they rarely initiate shareholder proposals.  
For instance, their guidelines express a preference for annual director elections rather than for 
staggered board terms. While indexers often support related proposals by other shareholders, the 
largest among them have never put forth their own proposals to make such a change.118  
 Defenders of indexers urge deference to their relative intervention, saying their vast 
economies of scale warrant presuming that their decisions are in the best interests of their 
investors.119 Critics of indexers say these practices show they are beholden to management.120 Still 
others chalk this up to “rational reticence:” proponents incur all costs of proposals but gain a 
fraction of the payoff, so it is rational to free ride by supporting others without taking the lead.121  
 The notion of rational reticence may be reinforced by a further possibility: the guidelines 
reflect “best practices” that are probably desirable for most while indexer inaction reflects that 
such practices are certainly undesirable for some. If indexers lack resources to determine what is 
best in given cases, the rational strategy may be to avoid taking the initiative but to support others 
who do so.   
E. Dual Class and Voting 
 The shareholder cultivation literature has devoted considerable attention to alternative 
capital structures and voting regimes, especially dual class shares and weighted-voting.  Professor 
Rock opines that dual class shares are costly and infrequent but seems to work in maintaining 
controlling-shareholder structure.122 Professor Masulis observes that dual class shares may have 
an adverse effect where insiders extract self-benefit and reduce company value to outside 
shareholders.123  
 One alternative is tenured voting (time-phased voting). These plans give long-term 
shareholders more votes.124 The logical upshot of the foregoing updating of the shareholder 
cultivation literature, of course, would be to refine tenured voting further to give quality 
shareholders more votes.125 While administrative challenges appear, the appeal to QS as a 
cultivation tool may be the most compelling of all. Certainly, it deserves a prominent place on both 
the corporate menu and the scholarly debating room.  
  
 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006). The task of self-evaluation, while 
important, is challenging, and observers are justified in skepticism about the results. 
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 125 I have extensively discussed quality voting, as well as dual class and tenured voting, see 
Cunningham, supra note 16, so refer readers to that analysis rather than repeat it.   
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CONCLUSION 
 This Article significantly expands the literature on corporate cultivation to shareholders to 
sculpt a shareholder base. The premise for doing so is intuition and evidence about the value to 
corporations, and society, of a substantial cohort that is both patient and concentrated. A high 
density of such shareholders is associated with superior corporate performance. In a world 
increasingly dominated by index investors, a vibrant QS cohort is especially vital. Managers 
wishing to attract QS in greater density can use both communications channels and substantive 
decisions to attract QS and repel others.  In reviewing these tools, the Articles adds to the case for 
empowering quality and outlines numerous tools available to corporate managers to do so.  While 
all shareholders contribute something to corporate life, cultivating quality promises outsized 
rewards to managers and investors alike. This Article can be seen as an updated playbook  
